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Abstract 
 
In recent years, there has been a great deal of debate about the pervasiveness and 
persistence of neoliberal thinking. In the context of the post-2008 ‘great recession’ the resilience 
of neoliberalism is particularly confounding. To begin to unravel the ways in which neoliberalism 
is situated relative to risk, this study identifies an increasingly important neoliberal knowledge 
practice: malagnogenesis. Malagnogenesis is proposed herein as the production of ignorance that 
normalizes harm for and amongst marginalized populations. To shed light on the phenomena of 
malagnogenesis, this study investigated the history of leaded gasoline in the U.S. To that end, I 
followed the production of ignorance from the introduction of gasoline lead additives in the early 
1920s to the contemporary discursive failure surrounding the impact that leaded gasoline has had 
on late 20th century urban crime rates. Finally, this study supported the hypothesis of 
malagnogenesis in academia via a survey of academics. 
1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter One 
 
Introduction and Theoretical Framework 
 
You know what I see when I look at those lots along the old tracks 
in northeast? Diamonds in the dirt. Everywhere we can build where 
there is dirt that needs to be remediated, there are diamonds buried 
in that dirt.1 
In recent years, neoliberalism has been referred to as a “zombie paradigm.”2 Despite many 
 
of its central tenets having been disproved and disavowed,3 prominent neoliberal voices and modes 
of thinking continue to dominate mainstream policy discourses. From environmental policy to 
urban planning, criminology and climate change, the “Overton Window” is restricted to the types 
of knowledge that neoliberalism produces.4 When markets “fail,” new markets are created or 
nurtured in order to repair the rift. When nature resists its commodification it is manipulated to fit 
into the neoliberal mold, in order to make nature “work.” Degrees of success and failure are 
measured strictly in financial terms, and nature is reshaped according to that standard. Academics 
and commentators have darkened a great many pixels debating the resilience of neoliberalism in 
an attempt to understand the implications for society of its continued dominance.5 In geography 
 
 
1 Hillsborough County Commissioner (District 2) Victor Crist, speech on 10/28/14 
2 Fisher, M. (2013). How to Kill a Zombie: Strategizing the End of Neoliberalism. Open Democracy, 18(07), 2013. 
3 Andrews, E. L. (2008). Greenspan concedes error on regulation. New York Times. Retrieved from: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/24/business/economy/24panel.html?_r=0 
4 Mirowski, P. (2013). Never let a serious crisis go to waste: How neoliberalism survived the financial meltdown. 
Verso Books. 
5 Peck, J., & Tickell, A. (2002). Neoliberalizing space. Antipode, 34(3), 380-404. 
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literatures this debate frequently takes the form of a struggle to define and describe what is meant 
by a “neoliberal nature.”6 Others have begun to consider the implications of a polis reshaped by 
and into homo-oeconomicus,7 while still others have called for better “ecological intelligence”8 or 
systems thinking, to help diagnose and mitigate problems born out of adherence to neoliberal 
rationality. Guided by environmental justice literatures9 and through a disparate impact lens, this 
study demonstrates how failures in knowledge practices and discourse act to abet the systematic 
production of risk as neoliberal nature and society. 
My hypothesis was that by examining the history of lead exposures in urban areas of the 
U.S., I may be able to shed some new light on the ways that knowledge making and semiotic 
processes are perverted in the service of neoliberal nature and society. This dynamic is particularly 
evident in the history of leaded gasoline, a treacherous and poorly understood story. For the 
purpose of this study, I conceive of this issue as comprised of two phases, generally separated by 
the 1986 ban of leaded gasoline in the U.S. The responses to each phase mirror a broader societal 
transition from pervasive racism to the “post-racial” colorblindness of homo-oeconomicus. While 
the similarities between the two phases are many, an exploration of their differences revealed how 
neoliberal nature and society continues to be so effective at normalizing harm for marginalized 
populations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 Castree, N. (2008). Neoliberalising nature: the logics of deregulation and reregulation. Environment and Planning. 
A, 40(1), 131. 
7 Brown, W. (2015). Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism's Stealth Revolution. MIT Press. p.31 
8 Goleman, D. (2009). Ecological intelligence: How knowing the hidden impacts of what we buy can change 
everything. Crown Business. 
9 Agyeman, J., Bullard, R. D., & Evans, B. (2002). Exploring the nexus: Bringing together sustainability, 
environmental justice and equity. Space and polity, 6(1), 77-90. 
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Financializing Nature and Society 
 
Under neoliberalism everything either is for sale or is plundered 
for profit.10 
How and why are risks produced? David Harvey has diagnosed this as having come about 
as a result of one of many periodic “capital surplus absorption problems.”11 With slow growth 
comes diminishing investment opportunities, and accumulation agents increasingly struggle to 
identify opportunities for capital circulation. Currently, tax rates on higher incomes in the U.S. are 
near historic lows. An already meager social safety net is increasingly weakened by austerity- 
minded policymakers. These trends have converged to produce crisis conditions ripe for the 
production and proliferation of risk. As the connotation of production implies, this is no accident. 
In prevailing economic conditions characterized by restless capital, the artificial production, 
uneven distribution, and guided relocation of risks are all essential to the continued propagation 
of accumulation regimes. In neoliberal nature and society, however, risk is a paradox: it exists 
concurrently as essential catalyst and grave enemy, with its manifestation as one or the other 
determined by one’s disposition relative to capital. According to Michael Dillon: 
The history of the emergence and operationalization of risk has 
therefore always been situated at the intersection of capital and rule. 
Rule seeks to secure governability. Capital seeks to profit. Risk 
combines the two in posing and securing subjects of self-rule not 
simply in conditions of uncertainty but in terms of measuring their 
exposure to contingency financially.12 
 
10 Giroux, H. (2004). Neoliberalism and the demise of democracy: Resurrecting hope in dark times. Dissident voice, 
7. 
11 Harvey, D. (2011). The enigma of capital: and the crises of capitalism. Profile Books. p.26. 
12 Dillon, M. (2008). Underwriting security. Security Dialogue, 39(2-3), 309-332. p.319. 
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The prolonged hegemony of neoliberalism fosters the increasingly pervasive financialization of 
life; individuals are encouraged to view their lives exclusively through a financial or 
entrepreneurial lens. This thought process relies on ascribing a broad utility to present value 
discounting (PVD), which rests on three false assumptions. First, PVD attempts to construct a 
homogenized future in which risks can be hedged or smoothed out of existence. This assumption 
only holds true to the extent that one possesses the resources necessary to hedge well defined risks, 
reinforcing the manifestation of risk as relative to one’s disposition to capital. Second, present 
understandings of risk are subject to existing biases and inequalities. Social sciences literatures 
have begun to explore the contours of a world at-risk,13 while mostly failing to consider the existing 
structural inequalities that serve to entrench the definition of some populations as “at-risk.”14 
Finally, many things are, or should be, irreducible to the financial. Indeed, some of the fiercest 
present day socio-economic battles15 are over the attempted financialization of various 
“uncooperative commodities;”16 things like water that inherently resist their commodification. If 
the value of something cannot be financialized in the present, PVD valuation methods thereof are 
considered nonsensical. Despite these contradictions, PVD is an influential neoliberal knowledge 
practice that shapes contemporary individual experiences of time, risk and value. This is 
particularly important for the aforementioned ‘uncooperative commodities,’ whose 
financialization is now accomplished largely via their transformation in the mind of the neoliberal 
 
 
 
 
 
13 Beck, U. (1992). Risk society: Towards a new modernity (Vol. 17). Sage. 
14 Martin, R. (2007). An empire of indifference: American war and the financial logic of risk management. Duke 
University Press. p.137-138 
15 Lobina, E. (2000). Cochabamba: water war. Focus, 7(2), 2. 
16 Bakker, K. J. (2003). An uncooperative commodity: Privatizing water in England and Wales. Oxford University 
Press. 
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subject. This process is considered crucial to the program of “roll-out” neoliberalism identified by 
Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell.17 
John Bellamy Foster has identified the “metabolic rift”18 between society and nature that 
is riven asunder by contradictions that are inherent in things like financialization and PVD. In order 
to enable the continued functioning of a system that is both rife with tensions and headed for a 
confrontation with planetary limits,19 the perversion of knowledge-making and semiotic processes 
via a certain ‘useful ignorance’ is necessary. To that end, Robert N. Proctor and Londa Schiebinger 
have argued for a focus on “agnotology,”20  which refers to the study of culturally induced 
ignorance. Other scholars have begun to use the agnotology framework to explore the contours of 
a metabolic rift that reproduces and unevenly distributes risks. Thus, the deliberate production of 
ignorance or “agnogenesis,”21 has been identified as one of the mechanisms by which neoliberal 
thinking22 perverts knowledge-making processes in the service of neoliberal nature and society. 
The Production of Socially Useful Risk 
In neoliberal agnogenesis, harm is reverse-engineered into risk, because risk is a circulation 
opportunity for capital. For the neoliberal policymaker, harmed populations disappear and are 
replaced with at-risk populations. To the neoliberal accumulation agent, who of course views the 
world through a PVD lens, risk is tolerable or manageable, even beneficial. Harm, on the other 
hand, is intolerable and frequently irreversible, so it is made to disappear. This process is 
 
 
17 Peck, J., & Tickell, A. (2002). Neoliberalizing space. Antipode, 34(3), 380-404. p.396. 
18 Foster, J. B. (1999). Marx's Theory of Metabolic Rift: Classical Foundations for Environmental Sociology 1. 
American Journal of Sociology, 105(2), 366-405. 
19 Rockström, J., Steffen, W. L., Noone, K., Persson, Å., Chapin III, F. S., Lambin, E., ... and Foley, J. (2009). 
Planetary boundaries: exploring the safe operating space for humanity. Ecology and Society 14(2): 32 
20 Proctor, R., and Schiebinger, L. L. (Eds.). (2008). Agnotology: The making and unmaking of ignorance. Stanford 
University Press. 
21 Dossey, L. (2014). Agnotology: On the Varieties of Ignorance, Criminal Negligence, and Crimes Against 
Humanity. Explore: The Journal of Science and Healing,6(10), 331-344. 
22 Peck, J. (2010). Constructions of neoliberal reason. Oxford University Press. 
6  
manifested in a phenomenon David Harvey has titled “accumulation by dispossession,”23 whereby 
accumulation agents attempt to alleviate a capital surplus absorption problem by managing their 
own risk(s) via systematic theft. Crises, manufactured and otherwise, are manipulated to that end. 
Thus, we are presented with the first victims of the agnogenesis paradigm. 
As anyone who has lived through the recent “great recession” should be well aware, 
manufactured crisis and subsequent austerity measures are often used to facilitate accumulation by 
dispossession, what Naomi Klein has called “disaster capitalism.”24 Crucial to disaster capitalism 
is the normalization of risk, giving rise to what some see as the normalization of an “endless 
crisis.”25 Since risk plus time actually equals harm, it could be argued that neoliberal knowledge 
practices in modernity serve to normalize harm. Randy Martin offers a clarification of how the 
normalization of harm is realized by referencing Michel Foucault’s treatment of Clausewitz’s 
famous quote; “war is the continuation of politics by other means.” According to Martin, Foucault 
“perceptively reverse(s) Clausewitz’s thesis… and offers a theory that politics is the normalization 
of war.”26 Anna Stanley extends this interpretation, arguing that (for Foucault): 
...problems of political economy are conceived and managed 
through new technologies of power as consequences of nature… He 
suggests that the task of government is no longer to intervene in, and 
interrupt or attempt to prevent (say) famines or scarcity, but to 
situate   these   events   within   nature,   to   understand   them   as 
 
 
 
23 Harvey, D. (2003). The new imperialism. Oxford University Press. p.137. 
24 Klein, N. (2007). The shock doctrine: The rise of disaster capitalism. Macmillan. 
25 Foster, J. B., and McChesney, R. W. (2012). The endless crisis: how monopoly-finance capital produces 
stagnation and upheaval from the USA to China. NYU Press. p.90. 
26 Martin, R., (2007). An empire of indifference: American war and the financial logic of risk management. Duke 
University Press. p.132. 
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consequences of natural fluctuations and tendencies, and to ensure 
the ‘‘normal’’ and unfettered operation of these tendencies.27 
It is important to note here that Foucault uses the term “government’ to describe the entity 
responsible for situating events within nature, but today it is more appropriate to talk about risk 
normalization as being brought about by and on behalf of powerful concentrations of capital. The 
state currently acts to facilitate this process, because it is captured by the hegemony of the 
neoliberal paradigm.28 Stanley’s interpretation offers an insight into the changing approach to risk 
under continued neoliberal hegemony. Risk is clearly identified as both a useful managerial 
strategy and as a knowledge practice. She discusses how: 
Risk tells the story of a flat geography. A story that obscures the way 
uneven geographies are produced and exploited, and that accounts 
for unevenness and dispossession as natural facts of aleatory 
phenomena. It is also a knowledge that articulates already existing 
differences and structures of difference in a way that allows the 
effects of production (cancers, radioactive and chemical 
contamination) to be invisibly absorbed by some of the most 
insecure, most precarious, and non-valuable people.29 
In Foucault and Stanley’s formulation of the production and deployment of risk, the state’s security 
interests and the needs of accumulation agents are convergent, working in concert to abet a more 
risk-intense nature. Michael Dillon seems to agree: 
 
 
 
 
27 Stanley, A. (2013). Natures of risk: Capital, rule, and production of difference. Geoforum, 45, 5-16. p.8. 
28 Anderson, P. (2000). Renewals. New Left Review, 1, 1-20. p.13. 
29 Stanley, A. (2013). Natures of risk: Capital, rule, and production of difference. Geoforum, 45, 5-16. p.13. 
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Paradoxical as it may sound, therefore, risk satisfies the desire for 
security by upping the ante and thereby massively increasing 
exposure to contingency, which it further translates into new risks. 
It does this by engendering an exponential increase in the ways in 
which everything is open to being addressed, valued and measured 
in terms of everything else, using exposure to contingency as the 
general measure or universal unit of account and exchange.30 
Dillon gets to the heart of the matter, but how are we to understand its implications for 
different groups in society who are exposed to these socially useful risks? What does it mean to 
say that the neoliberal project normalizes the aforementioned massive production of risk? Randy 
Martin points out that social stratification is increasingly mediated by the definition of some people 
as “risk-capable” and others as “at-risk.”31 As Neil Smith32 and David Harvey33 have 
demonstrated, capitalist laws of motion produce the difference and uneven development that 
characterizes so much of life in mature capitalism. Dysfunctional accumulation agents who find 
themselves at-risk can take solace in the knowledge that their predicament is necessary for the 
beneficial disposition of other, more successful accumulation agents. Neoliberal rationality 
dictates that humanity, rights, and normative values are not allowed to enter the equation. To that 
end, neoliberalism dictates that state-led development or remediation efforts must direct benefits 
towards those powerful, private accumulation agents. Benefits that flow to at-risk parties are 
mostly incidental - a product of the rhetorical power of deprivation harnessed to motivate signaling 
 
 
30 Dillon, M. (2008). Underwriting security. Security Dialogue, 39(2-3), 309-332. p.326. 
31 Martin, R. (2007). An empire of indifference: American war and the financial logic of risk management. Duke 
University Press. p.137-138 
32 Smith, N. (2008). Uneven development: Nature, capital, and the production of space. University of Georgia Press. 
33 Harvey, D. (2003). The new imperialism. Oxford University Press. 
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investments by the state. In this way, Foucault’s formulation of biopower/biopolitics can be 
extended and conceived of as a form of what I will refer to as ‘bioeconomics:’ that is, risk mediates 
the control and regulation of bodies and the spaces they inhabit for the sake of profitable 
exploitation. Risk in neoliberal nature is thus understood both as a knowledge practice and as an 
enforcement mechanism for the maintenance of bioeconomics. As homo-politicus succumbs to its 
gradual transformation into homo-oeconomicus,34 the political realm is eroded by the economic, 
and biopower / biopolitics is likewise transformed into bioeconomics. 
Agency in Neoliberal Nature and Society 
 
There are a many ways in which the neoliberal paradigm manages to produce, (unevenly) 
distribute, and normalize risks. A key example is the leveraging of perceptions of agency. 
Perceived degrees of choice have been shown to affect attitudes to risk exposure.35 That is to say, 
because an individual ‘chooses’ to live in a certain neighborhood, they are likely to be more willing 
to accept the environmental risks that frequently accompany lower rents. Neoliberal rationality 
incorporates the assumption of a universal agency, leaving unsaid the powerful underlying forces 
that actually govern these kinds of decisions. In John Steinbeck’s famous formulation, such at-risk 
populations are encouraged to view themselves as “temporarily embarrassed millionaires.” After 
all, neoliberal rationality tells us that risk plus time equals (financial) gain, not harm. 
Manifestations of this attitude were on stark display when Lawrence Summers described Africa as 
“under polluted”36 or when Jeffrey Sachs and Paul Krugman justified sweatshops as a good part 
of a normal development process for economically marginalized areas.37 Finally, as Aime Cesaire 
so presciently observed, attitudes like these, once directed outward, are always subject to a 
 
34 Brown, W. (2015). Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism's Stealth Revolution. MIT Press. P.31. 
35 Mythen, Gabe. (2004). Ulrich Beck. A critical introduction to the risk society. Pluto. p.101. 
36 Anon. (1992). Let them eat pollution. The Economist, 8. 
37 Myerson, A. (1997). In Principle, a Case for More 'Sweatshops.' New York Times, 22, 4-5. 
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boomerang effect: they eventually come back around.38 When harm is reverse engineered into 
opportunity, public officials like Hillsborough County Commissioner Victor Crist come to view 
pollution in their own cities as “diamonds in the dirt,”39 rather than historic and continued sources 
of real harm. Through the lens of neoliberal rationality, such marginalized populations should 
consider themselves lucky: their exclusion from the rewards of mature capitalism renders them 
perpetually at-risk, perpetually full of opportunity. Think of how fortunate the existing inhabitants 
of a newly gentrifying community are: once forced to move, they retain their status as at-risk 
parties, becoming ‘under-polluted’ all over again. 
The Environmental Justice Approach 
 
In his famous book, Dumping in Dixie, Robert Bullard pointed out that cases of 
environmental racism share a similar fallacious perception of agency wherein the illusion of choice 
is used to perpetrate what he calls “environmental blackmail.”40 In this way, a risk-intense, 
neoliberal nature can be placed in the context of those marginalized populations who are forced to 
bear the brunt of its vicissitudes. For at least thirty years, a wide ranging and powerful 
environmental justice literature has documented the myriad ways that certain groups are victimized 
by racist institutions. From landfill siting41 to toxic dumping,42 proximity to hazardous industrial 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38 Césaire, A. (2001). Discourse on colonialism. NYU Press. p.36. 
39 Hillsborough County Commissioner (District 2) Victor Crist, speech on 10/28/14 
40 Bullard, R. D. (2000). Dumping in Dixie: Race, class, and environmental quality (Vol. 3). Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press. p.85-86. 
41 Bullard, R. D. (1983). Solid Waste Sites and the Black Houston Community. Sociological Inquiry, 53(2-3), 273- 
288. 
42 Bachrach, K. M., and Zautra, A. J. (1985). Coping with a community stressor: The threat of a hazardous waste 
facility. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 127-141. 
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sites, automobile and air toxics,43 nuclear waste,44 and lead contaminated neighborhoods,45 
environmental justice researchers have demonstrated that a very different definition of economic 
“progress” exists for minority communities.46 Robert Bullard laid out some general characteristics 
of the environmental justice framework in 1990: 
1. ...the right of all individuals to be protected from environmental 
degradation. 2. ...a public health model of prevention as the 
preferred strategy. 3. ...shifts the burden of proof to polluters and 
dischargers who do harm, discriminate, or do not give equal 
protection to racial and ethnic minorities and other ‘protected’ 
classes. 4. ...allow disparate impact and statistical weight, as 
opposed to ‘intent,’ to infer discrimination. 5. ...redress 
disproportionate impact through ‘targeted’ action and resources.47 
To contextualize the above theoretical discussion about the financialization of nature, PVD, 
agnotology, the neoliberal production of risk, and the emergence of environmental injustice, I now 
turn to the example of lead exposures in urban areas in the U.S. in the second half of the twentieth 
century. This story demonstrates particular support for the public health model of prevention 
because lead exposures are not curable. Furthermore, the pervasive nature of exposures resulting 
from the burning of leaded gasoline points to the necessity of a disparate impact standard as 
 
 
43 Chakraborty, J. (2009). Automobiles, air toxics, and adverse health risks: Environmental inequities in Tampa Bay, 
Florida. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 99(4), 674-697. 
44 Fan, M. F. (2006). Environmental justice and nuclear waste conflicts in Taiwan. Environmental Politics, 15(03), 
417-434. 
45 Kraft, M. E., and Scheberle, D. (1995). Environmental justice and the allocation of risk: the case of lead and 
public health. Policy Studies Journal, 23(1), 113-122. 
46 Institute of Medicine (US) Committee on Environmental Justice. (1999). Toward environmental justice: 
Research, education, and health policy needs. National Academies Press (US). 
47 Bullard, R. D. (2000). Dumping in Dixie: Race, class, and environmental quality (Vol. 3). Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press. p.122-123. 
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opposed to a standard of intent. It is instructive in this context to remember Ulrich Beck’s insightful 
observation that “the more pollution is committed, the less is committed.”48 In the new world of 
risk theorized by Beck, one of the paradoxes of industrialism is that scale and complexity ensure 
that the allocation of blame for specific contaminants is increasingly difficult. Given these 
characteristics, the following analysis of the two phases of lead exposure is greatly informed by 
the environmental justice approach. 
Taking into account a disparate impact analysis of neoliberal policies in response to the 
two phases of lead pollution in U.S. cities, we can begin to understand the toxic alchemy of 
neoliberalism. Phase one refers to the (roughly) pre-1986 period when policy had yet to catch up 
with the (re-learned) science of lead poisoning. This phase is characterized by the public fight 
between Robert Kehoe and C.C. Patterson about background exposure levels in broad swathes of 
society. Phase two refers to massive social costs resulting from the legacy of this vast, involuntary 
experiment. This phase is characterized by a continued discursive failure in the sciences, the media, 
and society at large that has allowed exposures to persist in spite of massive social costs. This 
failure is part of a broader postmodern crisis of representation which the late English philosopher, 
Tony Judt described by saying: “our disability is discursive,” namely that “we simply do not know 
how to talk about these things anymore.”49 Accordingly, by exploring the different ways in which 
phase one and phase two were treated and responded to, we can begin to understand how modern 
knowledge practices shape the contours of neoliberal nature and society in a world at-risk. 
Pb in the U.S., Phase One 
 
History has much to teach us about lead poisoning. “Crazy as a painter” is an old saying 
that refers to the odd behavior exhibited by workers who spent their days in close contact with lead 
 
48 Beck, U. (1995). Ecological enlightenment: essays on the politics of the risk society. Humanities Press Intl. p.24. 
49 Judt, T. (2011). Ill fares the land: a treatise on our present discontents. Penguin UK. p.34. 
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paint. It is also well known that members of the eighteenth century French aristocracy called lead 
‘podre de la succession’ or ‘succession powder,’ to evoke the politically-relevant properties of the 
deadly yet sweet-tasting food additive. As early as 1965, historians even linked lead exposures to 
the hyper-violent decline of the Roman Empire.50 Roman plumbing systems used pipes and 
fixtures that were tainted with lead, and the Roman aristocracy was well known for its love of wine 
sweetened with lead. One oft-cited example is the Emperor Commodus, who was rumored to have 
been lead poisoned in childhood. Renowned for the level of violence associated with his rule, he 
reveled in personally executing hundreds of (often injured) Romans and animals in staged 
gladiatorial contests. For hundreds of years, the health effects of lead poisoning were well known, 
and modern scientific literatures have confirmed many of the symptoms known to history via 
anecdotal observance. 
What are those symptoms? High levels of lead exposure may result in comas, convulsions, 
and death.51 Lead is a powerful neurotoxin that accumulates in the body, and up the food chain. 
Once dispersed into human environments, lead does not dissolve, evaporate, or degrade. Instead, 
it remains in roadside soils and is tracked into indoor spaces via the soles of our shoes.52 Despite 
this, lead was common in many US consumer goods until nearly the end of the twentieth century. 
An extremely versatile metal, lead could be found in paints, containers, cosmetics, plumbing, and 
in some cases it was even used as a food additive. Those sources of contamination led to point- 
source exposures, for example, as deteriorating window sills made chips of lead paint available to 
children. In the early 1920s, researchers affiliated with General Motors introduced tetraethyl lead 
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to gasoline as an anti-knocking agent. Other engine manufacturers quickly followed suit, ushering 
in the widespread usage of leaded gasoline. In this way, point-sources of high-level lead exposure 
were exacerbated by the addition of pervasive low-level exposures. The lead exposures that 
resulted from this toxic combination have been referred to by a former Secretary of Health and 
Human Services as the “number one environmental threat to the health of children in the United 
States.”53 The exposure of massive populations in the U.S. to lead via the burning of leaded 
gasoline amounted to a vast experiment in “producing contaminated citizens,”54 an experiment 
that continues to haunt many cities to this day. 
The Vast Experiment 
 
In the aftermath of WWII, devastation in Europe and the luck of a well-positioned ocean 
combined to produce a period of prolonged economic expansion in the U.S. The postwar industrial 
expansion was coincident with the construction of the interstate highway system and rapidly 
accelerating suburbanization. This period saw a huge rise in the number of cars on U.S. roads. In 
1910, the car ownership rate was just over 5 per 1000 people. By 1940 that number had increased 
to 245, and by 1970 it had risen further still, to 545.55 For more than fifty years, cars burning leaded 
gasoline crisscrossed the country and packed the streets of U.S. cities. Other sources of lead 
contamination were (and remain) important loci of exposures,56 but gasoline additives spread it 
everywhere. Estimates of the total emissions load from the use of leaded gasoline during the period 
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1935-1985 range as high as seven million tons.57 Populations living near roadways and in high 
traffic areas were literally coated with toxic lead. Neighborhoods were toxified, accelerating the 
already powerful trend amongst the middle and upper classes toward suburbanization; the spatial 
fix dictated by capitalist imperatives. The conveniences afforded by automobile ownership 
fostered a perception that victory over nature was possible. The slow passage of time would reveal 
that the freedoms associated with car culture came with strings attached. In the inner cities, 
exposures from the burning of leaded gasoline were ubiquitous. For marginalized populations 
stuck living in heavily polluted cities, the slowly receding clouds of tailpipe smog would reveal 
some heavy strings indeed. 
Unsurprisingly, race, ethnicity, and class remain disturbingly good predictors of broader 
societal inequities in the U.S. for various historical and contemporary reasons. In light of a long 
history of overtly racist US housing policies,58 we should not be surprised that environmental 
justice researchers have consistently shown that marginalized populations continue to bear the 
brunt of these kinds of large-scale experiments. According to a 1992 report from the EPA, 
For diseases that are known to be environmentally induced, there is 
a lack of data disaggregated by race and socioeconomic variables. 
The notable exception is lead. Here the data are unambiguous: a 
higher percentage of black children than white children have high 
blood-lead levels.59 
 
 
 
 
57 Kitman, J. L. (2000). The secret history of lead. The Nation. New York, 270(11), 11-11. 
58 Dedman, B. (1988). The color of money. Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 1-4. 
59 United States Environmental Protection Agency. (1992c). Project LEAP, phase 1 Spatial and numerical 
dimensions of young minority children exposed to low-level environmental sources of lead, summary report. 
Chicago, IL: United States Environmental Protection Agency, Region 5. p.11. 
16  
How did this come to be? For those who couldn't leave, their ‘choice’ to remain in the city put 
them at-risk. There is a great deal of evidence to show that these at-risk populations were 
disproportionately comprised of minority households. In a study that focused on health disparities 
resulting from residential proximity to roadways in Tampa Bay, FL, Jayajit Chakraborty concluded 
that: 
In terms of the environmental justice implications, the results reveal 
a persistent pattern of racial and ethnic inequity in the distribution 
of estimated health risks. The presence of the minority population, 
in general, and African Americans and Hispanics, in particular, 
consistently indicate a highly significant and positive association 
with the degree of estimated health risk, even after controlling for 
all other relevant socioeconomic factors that potentially influence 
health risk60 
Such race-based environmental inequalities also persist independent of social class. According to 
Michael E. Kraft and Denise Scheberle: 
The ATSDR (Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry) 
found that African-American children were more than twice as 
likely as white children to have unacceptably high blood-lead levels, 
with 60% of all poor, inner-city African-American children 
exhibiting high blood-lead levels, compared to 36% of poor, `inner- 
city white children.61 
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Thus, a complex interplay between the two forces driving the vast experiment comes increasingly 
into focus. Racial and economic exploitation each produced the tragic circumstances in which poor 
and minority communities were both more likely to be subjected to environmental contaminants. 
Of course, those who were caught at the intersection thereof were the most at-risk. 
For years a ‘blame the victim’ or ‘blame the victim’s mother’ paradigm was prominent in 
addressing lead exposures. Rene J. Dubos referred to this failure as a “social crime.”62 David C. 
Bellinger and Andrew M. Bellinger speculated that this might have been due to the: 
...emphasis in clinical medicine on the individual patient and host 
risk factors rather than on the broader social, political, and economic 
contexts within which illness occurs, the responsibility for lead 
poisoning was placed on the victim and his or her family rather than 
on the dilapidated housing that caused it or on the institutions, 
policies, and regulations that permitted such lead hazards to exist.63 
Such reliance on a false dichotomy like the individual / society one is problematic, especially when 
it is cemented into the norms and practices of powerful institutions. A narrow focus on individual 
harm in medicine moved society farther away from the disparate impact standard, and allowed 
lead exposures to continue for decades. This is how experiments like the famous Kennedy Krieger 
Institute lead abatement trials in Baltimore could take place. In that study, minority children were 
recruited to live in lead contaminated housing as part of an effort to assess cost effective lead 
abatement strategies.64 Episodes like that one provide us with our first clear view of bioeconomics 
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in neoliberal nature and society. For the sake of the ‘health’ of public and private sector balance 
sheets, minority populations must be content with remediation strategies that are deemed cost- 
effective. Years of blaming the victim and pretending that widespread lead exposures didn’t exist 
helped to disappear systematically perpetrated harm in poor and minority communities, especially 
among children. Writing in 1999, Howard Mielke warned that in the case of lead exposures, out 
of sight is not out of mind: 
Although lead is no longer allowed in most gasoline products, the 
legacy of its use remains embedded in roadways and in U.S. cities… 
Children who live in these areas and play in these soils are 
particularly vulnerable to lead poisoning.65 
Put another way, children are still the most at-risk, but the illusion of agency for such children is 
the most fallacious of all. This is why parents were the ones made to shoulder the blame. By 
disappearing the worst harm, a vast experiment could be carried out. The reverberations of that 
vast experiment are still being felt today. Still, the acceptance of some basic principles of 
environmental justice might have helped us to avoid this calamity. For example, the use of a 
disparate impact standard could have had the benefit of laying bare systemic harm. Furthermore, 
adherence to a public health model of prevention would have made it very difficult to coherently 
argue for only those solutions which were deemed cost-effective. In a state of environmental 
injustice, the damage was done. According to Sven Hernberg: 
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...few single actions of man have had such extensive effects on the 
environment as the introduction of tetraethyl lead (TEL) as an 
additive of gasoline in the late 1920s.66 (in original) 
The end result of the vast experiment with leaded gasoline was that by the mid-1970s, 
median blood lead levels among all preschool children were fifteen micrograms per deciliter.67 
That is three times the current Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reference level 
of five micrograms per deciliter of blood. Worse still, the mean blood lead level of poor black 
children was 23 micrograms per deciliter, 18.5% of whom had a blood lead level greater than 30 
micrograms per deciliter, or fully six times the current CDC reference level.68 The use of gasoline 
lead peaked in the late 1970s,69 and its eventual ban had a dramatic effect on the population as a 
whole: 
The NHANES III survey estimated that blood-lead levels dropped 
over 78% between 1976 and 1991, with average blood levels of lead 
for people aged 1 to 74 decreasing from 12.8 micrograms per 
deciliter of blood to 2.8.70 
In light of the current CDC reference level of five micrograms per deciliter of blood, the figures 
for late twentieth century lead exposures are truly stunning. Consider this: in the late 1970s, 88% 
of all children in the U.S. would have exceeded the current CDC standard, by least 200%. If those 
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figures are tough to comprehend, it may be useful to recall the observation by Ulrich Beck that 
“the more pollution is committed, the less is committed.”71 Clearly, this qualified as a public health 
crisis. How could this have happened? 
The Fight to Ban Pb 
 
From the very beginning, a few voices attempted to call attention to the potential perils of 
leaded gasoline. Prior to the widespread introduction of lead to gasoline in the mid-late 1920s, 
Yandell Henderson at Yale University called it “probably the greatest single question in the field 
of public health that has ever faced the American public.”72 The perfunctory nature of the public 
debate could not have pleased Henderson. The 1925 meeting convened to discuss the potential 
health impacts of leaded gasoline lasted barely six hours. Other attempts to raise the issue of lead 
contamination throughout the mid-twentieth century were stymied by voices within the business 
and scientific communities. For years, any hint of a problem with lead exposures was ridiculed 
and dismissed as alarmist, and its proponents were labeled anti-progress, or anti-capitalist. The 
profit motive put lead in gasoline, but the intersection of policy and Science73 (capital S) kept it 
there for fifty years. 
The veritable personification of this intersection was Robert Kehoe, who was an expert in 
the science behind tetraethyl lead, and who helped to develop the first gasoline additives in the 
1920s. For this reason, he was the perfect person to spearhead their defense. The fact that he had 
so much skin in the game helped to ensure that he would spend the rest of his life defending their 
use. Kehoe was endowed by General Motors at Kettering Labs with his own division, and used 
this lofty perch to dominate public discourse on lead. In his commentary on the fight over leaded 
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gasoline, Herbert Needleman said that for nearly fifty years Kehoe “held an almost complete 
monopoly on Lead data.”74 During that time, Kehoe relentlessly beat back criticisms of leaded 
gasoline. He popularized phrases like ‘background exposure’ and ‘normal levels’ to dismiss those 
who raised concerns about blood lead levels. He took every opportunity to reinforce perceptions 
of lead contamination as a binary: isolated, solitary instances of ‘lead poisoning’ rather than the 
actual broad spectrum of lead exposures. Kehoe also attempted to conflate ‘normal’ with ‘natural’ 
by taking samples from a rural Mexican village, finding the presence of lead there as well. He 
conveniently ignored the fact that Mexican tableware at the time tended to contain lead. By 
demonstrating that everyone in his samples had some level of exposure to lead, Kehoe purported 
to have proven that low levels of lead exposure were normal, natural. It was a cruel irony that 
partly as a result of his work, lead exposure had indeed become normal. Again: the more pollution 
is committed, the less is committed. 
A final part of Kehoe’s strategy was to use Science as a discursive barrier. Kehoe used the 
power associated with his reputation as a scientist to attempt to create the spaces in which new 
statements could be made. An early Kehoe attack on C.C. Patterson, the man who would eventually 
destroy his reputation, gives us a good idea of how aggressively Kehoe defended his turf: 
I should let the man, with his obvious faults, speak in such a way as 
to display these faults… The inferences as to the natural human body 
burden of lead, are I think, remarkably naive. It is an example of 
how wrong one can be in his biological postulated and conclusions, 
when he steps into this field, of which he is so woefully ignorant and 
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so lacking in any concept of the depth of his ignorance, that he is not 
even cautious in drawing sweeping conclusions.75 
Kehoe’s role was high profile, but by no means is he alone in shouldering the blame for enabling 
the vast experiment with leaded gasoline. His position and research were funded by powerful 
business interests, and he was repeatedly granted authority by the state.76 During congressional 
testimony, Kehoe was identified as a researcher at the University of Cincinnati, despite the fact 
that the University paid only one dollar per annum of his salary. The rest was paid by industry 
groups. In this way, Kehoe was somewhat of an innovator, providing a blueprint for something 
that would later became common in environmental discourse: he used his authority and the 
authority of Science to act on behalf of industry. He used his research to intentionally confuse, 
enabling industry to take advantage of the dynamic identified by Steve Fuller: 
...the invocation of scientific findings, almost any findings will do, 
has turned out to be the most ideologically palatable means of 
coercing the populace.77 
For decades, Kehoe coupled this dynamic with the power he was granted by industry and 
government to stymie increasingly urgent calls for action. In the person of Robert Kehoe, Science 
was embodied as the enabler of the vast experiment. 
C.C. Patterson’s 1965 book The Contaminated and Natural Environments of Man78 would 
eventually succeed in bringing enough attention to the leaded gasoline issue to force regulatory 
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reforms. In the late 1960s, the CDC established a reference level for intervention of 60 micrograms 
per deciliter of blood, and subsequently lowered it to 40 micrograms in 1971, 25 micrograms in 
1985, ten micrograms in 1991,79 and finally to the current five micrograms in 2012.80 Moreover, 
the EPA began to directly regulate the use of leaded gasoline, which was gradually phased out 
starting in 1975, and completely banned in 1986.81 At the same time and with more mixed results, 
lead additives were removed from other consumer goods (e.g., paints) as well. Fifty years later, 
science (small ‘s’) had come to the rescue. In phase one of lead exposures, science acts as hero 
and Science as villain. The decades-long persistence of that dynamic is troubling. 
Lessons from Phase One 
 
In their summary article about lead exposures subtitled “The tortuous path from science to 
policy” David and Andrew Bellinger identify four lessons from the US experience with lead 
exposure: (1) average levels are not the same thing as the normal level; (2) individual prevention 
measures are important but broader policy measures are required as well; (3) industry 
demonstrated an unwillingness to self-regulate and; (4) risks are not distributed evenly.82 A lot of 
that isn’t so surprising, but this assessment shares some interesting characteristics with other 
diagnoses of the problem. In his retrospective, Herbert Needleman discussed the role played by 
C.C. Patterson, concluding that: “The blood lead levels of today’s children are a testimony to his 
brilliance and integrity.”83  The praise for Patterson is well deserved, but as the case of Robert 
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Kehoe demonstrates so well, reliance on individuals is problematic due to their fallibility and 
corruptibility. About Kehoe, Needleman said: “The durability of the extraordinary scientific 
solecism that lead in the body was natural is a testament to the shielding power of reputation.”84 
Again, the role of, and focus on the individual is crucial, the remarkable significance of which is 
evident on both sides of the conflict. The outsize role of individual personalities is troubling, 
because the resulting narrow focus can serve to disappear systemic problems. The same holds true 
for the “social crime” identified by Rene J. Dubos. We are again reminded that in a world at-risk, 
attribution of culpability requires the consideration of a disparate impact standard rather than a 
narrow focus on the individual, be they victims or heroes. 
The story of the fight to ban lead from gasoline in the US has been chronicled in great 
detail elsewhere and therefore will not detain us any further.85 I have, however provided a brief 
summary of the most important points, and the conclusions drawn by other researchers are clear: 
intersections between the practice of science and the influence of business were pernicious. On 
behalf of the interests of industry, Science was used as a cudgel, wielded by the defenders of a 
dominant thought paradigm that did not appropriately yield to new evidence. In recent years, this 
dynamic has been enthusiastically embraced in service of “roll-out” neoliberalism.86 There are 
many present day examples one can point to, climate denialism being a prominent one. Talking 
about what he calls the neoliberal “think tank collective,” an important cog in the self-perpetuation 
machine of neoliberal power structures, Philip Mirowski noted that: 
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The think tank collective does not abandon a hypothesis simply 
because it appears to stumble on a few facts and encounters 
strenuous opposition.87 
This was true of the fight to ban leaded gasoline in in our phase one, and it remains true today for 
a whole host of other similar discursive failures. Michel Foucault reminded us that knowledge is 
inseparable from the power it wields, and vice versa.88 In the case of leaded gasoline, this dynamic 
was on full display: Kehoe’s ‘background levels’ and the eventual CDC reference level(s) are a 
clear example of Science and policy working on behalf of industry to normalize new risks. From 
phase one, it is clear that individual personalities, flawed knowledge production regimes, and ill- 
founded government policies can exercise a great deal of sway over what constitutes truth. Decades 
old, the dominance of neoliberal rationality has reshaped individual perceptions of value through 
financialization and economism. With this knowledge, it becomes easier to understand how harm 
is made to disappear from neoliberal nature and society. 
Outlawing the Precautionary Principle 
 
A possible solution to phase one might have been found in the form of the precautionary 
principle. The principle, which has been in widespread use since about the 1980s, is meant to 
encourage prudential environmental regulation. As the name suggests, the precautionary principle 
demands preemptive caution in advance of scientific evidence or certainty of harm, but in practice 
its application has always suffered from inconsistency and a lack of clarity. For example, the Rio 
Declaration addressed the principle in the following rather generic and ill-defined way: 
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In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall 
be widely applied by the States according to their capabilities. 
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of 
full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing 
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.89 
The problems here are many. What is meant by phrases like ‘widely applied,’ ‘their capabilities,’ 
‘full scientific certainty,’ and ‘cost-effective?’ We have already seen how a focus on ‘cost- 
effective’ measures specifically disadvantages poor and minority communities, as was the case 
with the Kennedy Krieger trials. Furthermore, with its extension of environmental concerns 
beyond their normal or traditional domain, how can legal interpretations of a loosely defined 
concept be expected to remain consistent across different countries, for different peoples? 
According to a summary of the legal and policy history of the principle by Andrew Jordan and 
Timothy O’Riordan, they do not, because: 
...precaution emerged in one sociocultural context but has been 
reinterpreted as it has been integrated into neighbouring 
jurisdictions, each with its own set of political, economic and legal 
priorities. The precautionary principle, therefore, has to be seen in 
the context in which it is used.90 
For this reason, degrees of adherence to the principle fall somewhere on a spectrum from strong 
to weak, depending on how a given jurisdiction decides to interpret ‘cost-effective,’ ‘scientific 
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certainty,’ and so on. Furthermore, by making a vague reference to different sociocultural contexts, 
Jordan and O’Riordan let the true culprits off the hook. It goes without saying that neoliberal 
accumulation agents stand in opposition to the principle, which necessarily involves slowing 
economic growth (or limiting accumulation strategies) in the present for the sake of a better 
environment in the future. In the U.S., this opposition has been enshrined in law. For example, 
built into the Clean Air Act is a requirement that the enforcing agency must consider costs when 
determining whether regulations are appropriate and necessary. It was on this basis that the U.S. 
Supreme Court recently took action against two proposed EPA rules. 
First, in June of 2015, the court ruled that the EPA could not impose a rule intended to 
reduce mercury pollution from power plants. Arguing the majority opinion of the court, Justice 
Antonin Scalia attempted to trivialize considerations of the public good in environmental 
regulation, saying: 
One would not say that it is even rational, never mind “appropriate,” 
to impose billions of dollars in economic costs in return for a few 
dollars in health or environmental benefits.91 
Notably, for Scalia, both the economic costs and environmental benefits are quantified in financial 
terms, a position considered nonsensical for reasons discussed earlier. Scalia continues like this 
for several pages, bombastically denouncing the EPA and repeatedly claiming (inaccurately) that 
the agency refused to consider cost whatsoever in its rulemaking process. In her dissent to the 
majority opinion, Justice Elena Kagan began by highlighting the disingenuousness of the majority 
by listing the myriad (at least five) ways that the EPA had, in fact, considered costs during its 
rulemaking process. She continued, saying: 
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After all that, EPA conducted a formal cost-benefit study which 
found that the quantifiable benefits of its regulation would exceed 
the costs up to nine times over—by as much as $80 billion each year. 
Those benefits include as many as 11,000 fewer premature deaths 
annually, along with a far greater number of avoided illnesses.92 
Interestingly, Kagan’s dissent also struggles with the nonsensical financialization of nature. She 
could have based her argument on the less-easily quantified public good inherent in environmental 
regulation as its own end, but she chose to emphasize those benefits that could be expressed in 
financial terms. Premature deaths and avoided illnesses are neatly converted into the $80b/yr 
figure. Assessments such as these, guided by the narrow focus on the financial, are necessarily 
lacking. Normative evaluations are crucial, and typically are not profitable in a financial sense. 
Recall Tony Judt’s apt fulmination: “we simply do not know how to talk about these things 
anymore.”93 Furthermore, restricting the EPA in this manner effectively outlaws the precautionary 
principle, and makes a public health model of prevention much more difficult to follow. It goes 
without saying that the precautionary principle was not mentioned in the majority opinion, but it 
is also notably absent from Justice Kagan’s dissent. Fortunately, as a result of quirks in the federal 
rulemaking process, this specific regulation happens to still be in place. In March of 2016, the 
Supreme Court refused to grant a stay of the regulation requested by twenty states, while the EPA 
completed an additional cost benefit assessment.94 
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A second Supreme Court action provides another example of the deficit in normative 
reasoning. In another case involving regulation of electricity producers, the Supreme Court issued 
an order that temporarily blocked an attempt by the EPA to regulate carbon dioxide emissions 
from coal plants. This initiative, part of President Barack Obama’s Clean Power Plan, would have 
eventually reduced emissions from coal fired power plants by about 30%. Seen as crucial to the 
viability of the 2015 Paris climate accord, it is not surprising that the conservative wing of the 
court sprang into action. In fact, according to Adam Liptak and Coral Davenport in the New York 
Times: 
The 5-4 vote… was unprecedented - the Supreme Court had never 
before granted a request to halt a regulation before review by a 
federal appeals court.95 
The Supreme Court order in this instance was only two paragraphs long. It provides no additional 
detail and offers no justification for such an unprecedented action. All we know is that five 
members of the court considered the complaint brought by the petitioners urgent enough to put a 
stay in place prior to the ruling of the lower court. For the time being, the coal plants in question 
are safe from any additional regulation, at least until the lower court has its say. In this case it may 
have been the objective of the majority to send a clear message to the international community: 
commitments made by representatives of the executive branch in international negotiations are not 
reliable. The ultimate outcome of this case remains uncertain, though the prospects for the EPA’s 
proposed rules are somewhat improved with potential changes to the makeup of the court. 
Interestingly, the order also remanded the case to the DC Circuit Court of Appeals, which is a bit 
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of a wild card. The DC Circuit Court has eleven active members, four of whom were appointed by 
Republican presidents. Cases heard by the DC Circuit Court are considered by a randomly selected 
three judge panel. This arrangement can lead to some strange outcomes. A notorious DC Circuit 
Court ruling in 2012 struck down EPA rules aimed at regulating interstate air pollution. Writing 
in the Washington Post about what he calls a “war on federal regulatory agencies,” Steven 
Pearlstein had some harsh words for the court: 
The projected annual compliance cost is $2.4 billion, compared with 
the annual health benefits of anywhere from $120 billion to $280 
billion… You find an appeals court judge so dismissive of the most 
fundamental rules of judicial restraint that he dares to throw out 
regulations on the basis of concerns never raised during the rule- 
making process or in the initial court appeal.96 
It is possible that the EPA rules mentioned above could meet the same fate, though the ideological 
balance of the DC Circuit Court has shifted somewhat in recent years. Still, the makeup of any 
given three judge panel is simply the luck of the draw. In these contemporary fights over 
regulation, environmental rules are deliberately held to a nonsensical standard, and are sometimes 
decided by what amounts to a roll of the dice. Furthermore, even when the easily quantified 
financial benefits to regulation far outweigh the associated costs (in the last example, by a 
staggering two orders of magnitude), activist conservative judges settle for other means of 
dissembling and disassembling. The examples raised here highlight the contested nature of truth 
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in neoliberal nature and society, and just how far the U.S. is from embracing even a weak 
precautionary approach. 
Arguments for the deliberate slowing of economic growth today are met with ridicule, 
while they barely registered at all in the initial debate over leaded gasoline. The U.S. in the roaring 
twenties was not particularly inclined toward a precautionary approach. Though the precautionary 
principle did not exist as such in the 1920s, given the magnitude of the experiment being 
undertaken one might have expected a hint of prudential reservation. Then, as now, the lure of 
money, growth, and “progress” was too strong. For one example, consider Standard Oil’s Frank 
Howard, who evangelized tetraethyl lead as “a gift of god that conscience and the march of human 
progress compelled GM to exploit.”97 Robert Kehoe, always eager to shill, confronted this issue 
head on by inverting the intuitive conception of precaution. He argued that critics must first 
affirmatively prove the health risks of lead in order to justify any regulatory intervention. It was a 
transparent attempt to shift the burden of proof from the polluting industry to the contaminated 
citizens, and it was fairly successful. Kehoe’s ‘show me the data’ approach has come to be known 
as the Kehoe Paradigm.98 
The success of the Kehoe Paradigm was a precursor to modern efforts to rebut the 
precautionary principle. Recent Supreme Court actions holding the EPA to nonsensical standards 
provide clear evidence of this phenomenon. Despite more than nine decades of experience with 
the vast experiment of lead exposures, little has changed in contemporary rhetorical and political 
contests over the precautionary principle. Indeed, similar stories can be told in any number of other 
cases, including thalidomide, CFCs, PCBs, asbestos, C8, climate change, and more. The full 
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accounting would be too long and sad to undertake here. The normalization of harm via 
‘background levels’ and ‘normal levels’ of exposure for the sake of “the march of human progress” 
gives us a preview for how these contests will continue to play out in contemporary neoliberal 
nature and society. The central thrust of the Kehoe Paradigm still holds true today, and the “religion 
of our day,” the “belief in progress and productive forces” all but guarantees that other vast 
experiments will be carried out.99 
Pb in the U.S., Phase Two 
 
By phase two I do not refer precisely to a specific period of time or pre/post any significant 
policy measure. Rather, it is meant to evoke the evolving state of understanding about the effects 
of lead exposure near the beginning of the twenty-first century. I began by talking about how the 
health effects of lead have been well known for hundreds of years. While true, this is only relevant 
in regard to the state of knowledge about those easily observable, high levels of lead exposure 
commonly referred to as lead poisoning. Phase two refers to the residual effects of widespread 
low-level lead exposures: the continued legacy of the vast experiment. 
We have already seen how the CDC’s reference level for lead was repeatedly revised 
downward after 1975. Recent studies have made a persuasive case that there is actually no safe 
level of lead exposure at all, and that the current standard of five micrograms per deciliter of blood 
should be lowered to at least two micrograms.100 These arguments rest on the fact that cognitive 
impairments from lead exposure manifest even at very low exposure levels. According to Michael 
E. Kraft and Denise Scheberle: 
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At low levels, lead poisoning in childhood may cause reductions in 
intellectual capacity (as measured by standard IQ tests) and attention 
span, reading and learning disabilities, hyperactivity, impaired 
growth, or hearing loss.101 (in original) 
With the aid of sophisticated measurement technologies, we now understand that even very low 
levels of exposure can have an impact on indices like IQ. In fact, the incremental magnitude of the 
resulting impact actually decreases as exposure levels increase. In other words, exposures at zero 
to five micrograms per deciliter of blood contribute more to the overall impact on IQ than do 
exposures at six to ten micrograms.102 
In addition to IQ, several recent studies have investigated the impact of early childhood 
lead exposure on academic performance. Sammy Zarhan et al. found that early childhood exposure 
to lead was “significantly associated with reductions in test scores across all subjects and depress 
variation in student performance across achievement categories.”103 Tomas Rau at al. documented 
“a strong relationship between blood lead levels and student academic performance.”104 Other 
developmental disorders have been linked to lead exposure as well. Shuangxing Hou et al. found 
that: “Lead poisoning has adverse effects on the behavior and mental development of 2–4-year- 
old children.”105  Jessica Reyes found that “Elevated levels of blood lead in early childhood are 
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shown to adversely impact standardized test performance”106 With these findings, the academic 
community was finally coming around to the perspective long advocated by Herbert Needleman, 
who for years had pushed back on binary perceptions of lead exposure. In 1990, Needleman 
offered the following comment, which would prove disturbingly prescient: 
...exposure to lead, even in children who remain asymptomatic, may 
have an important and enduring effect on the success in life of such 
children.107 
It was becoming clear that the vast experiment involved all manners of hidden costs. Early 
on, a 1990 study by the EPA attempted to quantify the to-date benefits of the Clean Air Act. Part 
of that study estimated the total lost IQ points that would have resulted had lead not been phased 
out of gasoline in the 1980s. As described by Steven Gilbert and Bernard Weiss, the EPA study 
“...calculated that the benefits of lead removal, based on IQ alone, translated into one trillion 
dollars.”108 Another study, this one by Scott D. Grosse et al., attempted to quantify the benefits of 
the ban to the lifetime earnings of each cohort of (less) lead exposed children. By comparing higher 
IQ levels of less exposed 1990s children with the lower IQ levels of more exposed 1970s children, 
they estimated an annual benefit of $110-$319B (constant year 2000 dollars). Interestingly, the 
authors characterize this benefit as “one of the great success stories of public health in the United 
States in the last quarter century.”109 Finally, when viewed from a global perspective, the benefits 
from a phase-out of leaded gasoline are even more pronounced. A 2011 study by Peter L. Tsai and 
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Thomas H. Hatfield took U.S. estimates and extended them to the rest of the world, finding “a 
global benefit of $2.45 trillion/year, within a range of $2.05–$2.83 trillion.”110 For the sake of 
context, and with the obvious stipulation that GDP is a deeply flawed statistic, global GDP in 2013 
was about 75 trillion dollars. There can be no doubt that the vast experiment with lead exposures 
has been a costly one in financial terms. Unfortunately, lead exposures cannot be solely measured 
in lost IQ points or in lost productivity. 
Pb and Violence 
 
If low levels of lead exposure are linked to developmental problems like decreases in IQ, 
might they also be linked to other social phenomena like crime and violent behavior? Recalling 
Emperor Commodus, a number of researchers began to wonder if our vast experiment with lead 
exposures might in some way mirror the Roman experience. One of the earliest researchers to 
emphasize the lead / violence link was Deborah W. Denno. In her book, Biology and violence: 
From birth to adulthood, Denno found that “lead intoxication” was a powerful predictor of both 
adult male offenses and delinquency.111 Notably, leaded gasoline is not mentioned in Denno’s 
early work, and this may be why her study adheres to the binary conception referenced earlier. 
Subjects in Denno’s work are discussed as suffering from either “lead intoxication” or “lead 
poisoning,” not the actual spectrum of lead exposures that we understand today. Another early 
study, this one by Kim N. Detrich at al. confirmed the association between lead exposures, 
antisocial behaviors and juvenile delinquency.112 Finally, Herbert Needelman et al. found that 
“Elevated body lead burdens, measured by bone lead concentrations, are associated with elevated 
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risk  for  adjudicated  delinquency.”113   The  murky  contours  of  the  production  and  uneven 
distribution of risk in neoliberal nature and society were beginning to come into focus. 
Progress on the lead / violence link was slow until the mid-2000s. In some of the first 
research that looked at possible exposure to airborne lead as a predictor of crime, Paul B. Stretesky 
and Michael J. Lynch demonstrated a connection between property and violent crime generally114 
and county-wide murder rates specifically.115 Rick Nevin, an economic consultant, has published 
on the lead / violence issue almost constantly since 1999.116 Nevin’s 2000 paper titled; “How lead 
exposure relates to temporal changes in IQ, violent crime, and unwed pregnancy” found 
remarkable consistency across several categories of crime and antisocial behavior.117 Nevin was 
even able to predict sharp declines in violent crime nationwide after the year 2000, saying: 
If the association between gasoline lead and social behavior 
continues into the future, then violent crime and unwed teen 
pregnancy could show dramatic declines over the next 5 to 10 
years.118 
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Nevin was able to make this prediction because his analysis rested on the application of an eighteen 
to twenty-two year time lag from childhood lead exposures to violent behavior later in life. For 
this reason, Nevin is widely regarded as a clarion voice on the topic. Others have built on his work, 
including Jessica Reyes, who is widely cited for her comprehensive 2007 analysis of the lead / 
violence link, in which she found that “changes in childhood lead exposures are responsible for a 
56% drop in violent crime in the 1990s.”119 Eventually, researchers were able to move from 
studying lead exposure as one of many explanatory variables to looking at it as a predictive factor. 
John Paul Wright et al. conducted “the first prospective study to demonstrate an association 
between developmental exposure to lead and adult criminal behavior.” They found that: “Prenatal 
and postnatal blood lead concentrations are associated with higher rates of total arrests and/or 
arrests for offenses involving violence.”120 In another important study, Howard Mielke and Sammy 
Zahran examined the lead / violence question by tracking historic lead emissions in six cities. Next, 
much like the methodology used by Nevin, they applied a twenty-two year time lag and compared 
emissions with rates of aggravated assault. They reported their remarkable findings thusly: “...our 
model explains 90% of the variation in aggravated assault across the cities examined.”121 Prior 
studies had not examined the lead / violence link at the city level, making this study especially 
significant in demonstrating the implications for environmental justice of ongoing lead exposures 
in urban areas of the U.S. The link that was materializing revealed a whole new explanation for 
the crime wave of the late twentieth century, and it had held true at different scales, in different 
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cities, and even across different countries that banned leaded gasoline at different times. The 
connections being made were hard to believe, and at times, shocking. 
Discursive Failures 
 
With an evolving understanding about the impact of low-level lead exposures, voices 
within the public health, environmental justice and environmental policy communities now argue 
that the CDC reference level should be eliminated altogether and replaced with efforts at outright 
prevention. After all, much of this new understanding had been established in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, while the CDC reference level held steady at ten micrograms per deciliter of blood. 
In fact, the CDC did revisit its definition in 2002. Controversy erupted when the Bush 
Administration’s Secretary of Health and Human Services, Tommy Thompson, took the 
unprecedented step of replacing the CDC’s five member advisory committee with: “five 
individuals… likely to oppose a more stringent federal standard.”122 Criticism abounded, but the 
reference level remained unchanged until 2012. Unfortunately, the legacy of such a vast 
experiment will not disappear overnight, or even in a few years. The intervening years have seen 
a widening metabolic rift and knowledge gap that has taken its toll. Other knowledge regimes have 
moved in to fill that gap, and the attendant policy regimes have built up a strong constituency. 
Despite all this new research, there is currently almost no public debate about the lead / 
violence link in criminological literatures or in the press. A glance at the Google News search 
results for ‘crime rate drop’ returns a bevy of articles about the recent, precipitous drop in urban 
crime rates. The explanations on offer for the rise and subsequent decline in crime range widely: 
(1) police use of new technologies; (2) a rise in the incarceration rate; (3) online banking; (4) low 
inflation; (5) President Obama’s good behavioral example; (6) concealed carry laws; (7) ‘stand 
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your ground’ laws;123 (8) the decline of the nuclear family; (9) growing ethnic diversity; (10) the 
rise (and fall) of the so-called ‘superpredator;’ (11) violent computer and video games; (12) 
economic inequality; (13) ageing populations; (14) crack and heroin epidemics “appear to have 
burnt out;” (15) predictive policing;124 (16) gun buybacks; (17) the great recession;125 and (18) 
urban removal efforts.126 A 2009 Washington Post article entitled “Drop in violent crime in D.C. 
and some other major cities puzzles experts” exemplifies the coverage. According to the 
Washington Post, the decline in urban crime is: “a trend criminologists describe as baffling and 
unexpected.”127 Lead exposures rarely merit a mention. When the role of lead pollution is brought 
up, it is almost always dismissed as one of the many wacky explanations unworthy of any serious 
consideration. 
How can the widespread ignorance of such an important topic persist? Robert Kehoe has 
been retired since 1965, dead since 1992, and his research has few heirs.128 Lead has been banned 
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from gasoline since 1986 and its use in all other mediums severely restricted. Still, the legacy of 
its use is literally embedded in the roadside soils of all cities, not to mention the bodies of those 
made to carry the burden. Trillions of dollars in economic benefits have been realized from the 
ban already, yet the ongoing social costs are virtually ignored in criminological literatures and the 
press. The continued threat to children from lead-contaminated urban areas would seem to merit 
more attention in public and policy discourses. Discussions surrounding criminology, urban 
sustainability, smart growth, and exposure to environmental contaminants should at minimum 
include mentions of this issue. Who or what is to blame for this broad discursive failure? 
Casting Blame 
 
One possible explanation could be that phase one always had a relatively easy solution. 
When the public menace was ‘lead poisoning‘ rather than ‘lead exposure,’ mitigation was a much 
lower bar to clear. Vehicle emissions standards were established, catalytic converters were 
introduced, and lead was removed from gasoline. Ongoing low-level lead exposures have no such 
easy solution. After all, slowing or preventing new emissions is one thing, but seven million tons 
of lead have already been dispersed in human environments. Remediation initiatives are saddled 
with substantial upfront costs. Still, several studies have demonstrated the long term financial 
acuity of investments in remediation. One such study suggested that all U.S. cities would benefit 
from a substantial investment in the remediation of lead contaminated soils.129 Crucially, these 
kinds of solutions are confounded by two of the central tenets of neoliberalism referenced earlier. 
The benefits from policy interventions must be financialized, and must be captured by private 
accumulation agents (e.g., in brownfield credits) rather than by those living in contaminated 
neighborhoods or by society as a whole. Until their ‘risks’ can be financialized, dysfunctional 
 
129 Mielke, H. W., and Zahran, S. (2012). The urban rise and fall of air lead (Pb) and the latent surge and retreat of 
societal violence. Environment International, 43, 48-55. p.54. 
41  
accumulation agents living in lead contaminated neighborhoods are made to fulfill their neoliberal 
destiny: they become vessels for socially useful risk. Needless to say, a precautionary approach or 
an effective planning regime to counter such vast experiments also runs contrary to the production 
of this socially useful risk. 
Another explanation could be that lead exposures under phase one largely took place prior 
to the Reagan revolution and neoliberalism’s subsequent dominance. As the neoliberal paradigm 
has come to dominate policy discourses, mature capitalism in the U.S. has become increasingly 
unfriendly to large scale public projects or investments on behalf of the public. The fiscal 
constraints imposed on cities and states by neoliberalism’s preferred variety of crisis capitalism 
make such local public initiatives difficult to fund.130  Furthermore, phase one policy responses 
were put in place during a period of widespread concern for the environment. In the late 60s and 
early 70s, the environmental movement had established itself as a force in national politics, but 
had not yet been subjected to the politicization and co-optation associated with many large 
environmental groups today. Still, residents of the U.S. were choking on tailpipe emissions for 
fifty years before major policy interventions began to clear the air. Phase two exposures and their 
effects have only recently come to the fore, and remain relatively unknown and unacknowledged. 
A final possible explanation for the persistence of phase two exposures are the strong 
inertial forces spanning academic and government circles that have been built up, and that now 
entrench themselves against alternate versions of events. For some, the urban crime wave was the 
result  of  a  combination  of  the  following:  (1)  the  moral  failings  of  minority  and  poorer 
communities; (2) the dissolution of the traditional family,131  and; (3) the rise of a new kind of 
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juvenile ‘superpredator.’ Neoliberal academics, pundits, and politicians all made careers by 
exploiting fears of crime. This was accomplished by appealing to an ‘us vs. them’ mentality fueled 
by thinly veiled racism and urban revanchism more generally.132 It is worth quoting at length one 
of these arguments, to illustrate the kind of vitriol that was commonly deployed in the service of 
this agenda: 
On the horizon, therefore are tens of thousands of severely morally 
impoverished juvenile super-predators. They are perfectly capable 
of committing the most heinous acts of physical violence for the 
most trivial reasons… They fear neither the stigma of arrest nor the 
pain of imprisonment. They live by the meanest code of the meanest 
streets, a code that reinforces rather than restrains their violent, hair- 
trigger mentality. In prison or out, the things that super-predators get 
by their criminal behavior - sex, drugs, money - are their own 
immediate rewards. Nothing else matters to them. So for as long as 
their youthful energies hold out, they will do what comes 
“naturally:” murder, rape, rob, assault, burglarize, deal deadly drugs, 
and get high.133 
The inertial forces that I am concerned with are best viewed in the context of ‘tough on crime’ 
policy responses to the urban crime wave of the late twentieth century. Pushed by research from 
neoliberal think tanks like the Manhattan Institute, broken windows policing strategies were 
popularized and propagated. It is instructive here to recall Philip Mirowski’s idea of these 
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institutions as a neoliberal “think tank collective,”134 working to enable (and enforce) adherence 
to neoliberal rationality despite a multitude of manifest contradictions. In that light, it is not a 
surprise that their preferred policing strategy would be aimed at re-inscribing the dominant 
ideology. According to Steve Herbert and Elizabeth Brown: 
..the spatial logics of broken windows and situational crime 
prevention both adhere with and help legitimate broader neoliberal 
policies, in ways that entrench socio-spatial exclusion.135 
Policing Disorder 
 
In the early 1990s, the implementation of broken windows took shape as cities adopted a 
stats-driven approach to drug war policing. More police were hired and instructed to refuse a ‘look 
the other way’ attitude for minor infractions like graffiti, parking tickets, jaywalking, etc. Police 
activity was also intensified in certain high-crime neighborhoods.136 For critics, this broken 
windows policing more closely resembled “the criminalization of black life,”137 an assessment that 
is consistent with the Nixon Administration’s original intent for the drug war. Booming prison 
populations in the U.S. after 1980138 coupled with “the new Jim Crow”139 and the emergence of a 
“school  to  prison  pipeline”140   demonstrate  some  of  the  results  of  these  policing  methods. 
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Concurrent growth in the newly-privatized ‘prison industry’ is another troubling example of the 
influence of neoliberal rationality. The alternate realities built up by these inertial forces reproduce 
the status of poor and minority communities as marginalized, and reconstitute them via what 
begins to resemble a vicious cycle for at-risk populations. 
Who or what is responsible for contributing to these inertial forces? Occam’s Razor would 
suggest that we ask ‘cui bono?’ Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and his police commissioner William 
Bratton pioneered broken windows policing in New York City (NYC). Bratton went on to help 
spread broken windows tactics to several other cities including Boston, Oakland, London, and Los 
Angeles. He was well rewarded and highly decorated, and even returned to NYC as police 
commissioner under Mayor de Blasio in 2014. Meanwhile, Giuliani leveraged his post-9/11 fame 
to spread broken windows policing strategies internationally via his security consulting group, 
Giuliani Partners. The very secretive firm was linked to contracts in countries as far afield as 
Brazil, Qatar, Mexico, Japan, and more. Indeed, through 2007 Giuliani Partners had made more 
than $100 million by trading on Giuliani’s reputation as a crime fighter.141 
Academics in the U.S. have spent years debating the efficacy of broken windows policing, 
with a general consensus that the results have been mixed. A recent broken windows review article 
found that it had a “statistically significant, modest crime reduction effect.”142 In New York City, 
the birthplace of broken windows policing, review literatures have concluded that “studies did not 
provide clear evidence of effectiveness.”143  A full investigation of broken windows policing 
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strategies is beyond the scope of this study, but there are clearly some powerful rewards available 
to anyone willing to wage a war built on false premises. As a result, debates about the merits of 
broken windows policing tend to miss the forest for the trees. The discursive failures mentioned 
above are not limited to the press. In a 2009 review of criminological literature and its treatment 
of the lead / violence link, Raymund Narag et al. concluded: “To date, these findings have not been 
placed in the context of or integrated into criminological theory.”144 Table One145 below further 
illustrates this problem. 
 
 
The single mention of “leaded gasoline” in the British Journal of Criminology was in an article 
co-authored by Michael Lynch and Paul Stretesky. This is the same duo who attempted to instigate 
a conversation about the lead / violence link with their work in the early 2000s which was 
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referenced earlier. The other mention of “leaded gasoline” came in a 2015 article which analyzed 
period and cohort effects to try to explain reductions in crime in New York State. No attempt was 
made to integrate the lead / violence link into criminological theory; it was simply mentioned as 
one possible explanation for the results. 
Attempts to integrate the lead / violence link into criminological theory are not only rare; 
at times it seems as if they are being studiously avoided. A particularly stark example of this was 
found in a 2012 article in the Journal of Criminal Justice.146 Many readers may recoil when 
Michael Rocque et al. call for an emphasis on “biological crime prevention” and attempt to 
evaluate “the relevance of biology to modern day crime prevention.” Much like the writing that 
currently sits in front of you, the authors attempt to approach a difficult subject in a “sociologically 
sensitive manner.” In large part they succeed, discussing a myriad of ways for preventive measures 
to help to mitigate the incidence of mental illness, cognitive deficits, impulsivity, and aggression. 
Recognizing that many of these problems have their genesis in early childhood, the prescriptions 
on offer are mostly appropriate: family centered, pre-school and school based programs, as well 
as nutritional assistance to improve “environmental conditions” for children. In fact, the authors 
discuss many different environmental aspects of both criminality and well-being, and yet the lead 
/ violence link escapes any mention. The authors even approvingly cite the work of John Paul 
Wright with no mention of his other research into the lead / violence link. It seems the authors 
knew that if they were to mention the lead / violence link, they would have a very hard time seeing 
their work published in a prominent criminology journal. The agnogenesis of this enforced silence 
is pervasive, reaching all the way to the Justice Department (DOJ). The subject is missing from 
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both the 2013 Smart on Crime comprehensive review, and does not merit any mention in the DOJ’s 
2014-2018 strategic plan or strategic goals. 
Given our experience with phase one of lead exposures, the collective failure to confront 
phase two is concerning. The many billions (trillions?) of dollars available to be saved, the toll in 
human suffering, and the mounting evidence of calamitous aftershocks are all insufficient to move 
the needle. In the service of neoliberal nature and society, how is the normalization of such a 
persistent and wide metabolic rift to be accomplished? How else but through socially enforced 
ignorance could this be possible? The reaction in phase one makes it clear that phase two may 
persist for many years, but one interesting divergence is that phase two seems to persist even in 
the absence of a constituency. Phase one was enabled by the toxic intersection of Science and 
profit, while phase two seems to persist only in service of the status quo. In the absence of an 
‘easy’ solution, in this case, one compatible with the imperatives of neoliberalism, Foucault argued 
that forces in society will attempt to situate these things in nature (i.e., outside society), thereby 
making them normal. The normalization of harm at this scale is difficult, requiring powerful tools 
and resources for the sustained manipulation of public understandings of risk. Whatever the 
reasons for this rift, it presents us with an opportunity to investigate an instance of agnogenesis in 
real time. 
Malagnogenesis and the Disappearance of Harm 
 
With this background in mind, it is increasingly clear that the cognitive sacrifices necessary 
to sustain neoliberal nature and society are manifested in dissociation with one’s humanity. Others 
have provided reams of eloquent evidence in support of this observation, but it is all rooted in what 
David Harvey has called the “universal alienation” of mature capitalism.147 When risks are difficult 
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to normalize, society is faced with a choice. First, we might take the difficult step of confronting 
the contradictions underlying modern life. We could invest in solutions with the greatest forecasted 
effectiveness, position those investments to have the broadest impact, and allow the mitigation of 
risk to benefit the wide spectrum of society. Alternatively, we might produce conditions in which 
those risks can be made invisible, disappeared, or forgotten. As discussed above, the latter path, 
agnogenesis, is the preferred method under neoliberalism. That said, it should be noted that 
agnogenesis does not always entail a negative connotation. There are many examples of beneficial 
agnogenesis in society. Individual privacy protections, voting by secret ballot, and the Fifth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution are all examples of agnogenesis in the service of the public 
good.148 Functional agnogenesis can be useful as well, as evidenced by certain “public secrets”149 
that allow for a smooth(er) functioning of the sciences, society, etc., in spite of contradictions and 
difficult truths. Herein, however, lies the danger. Agnogenesis is a well-established, but not well 
understood, knowledge practice that is therefore ripe for abuse. Consequently, to differentiate from 
good or functional agnogenesis, I propose the concept of malagnogenesis, which refers to 
agnogenesis that serves to normalize adverse impacts for and amongst marginalized populations. 
It is through this lens, tinted by a disparate impact approach borrowed from environmental justice, 
that I investigate the ongoing crisis of lead exposures. As Paul Wenzel Geissler put it: 
Only by attending ethnographically to the work of unknowing itself 
can we begin to grasp the social processes that unknowing enables 
and then proceed to discern, and engage in, their contradictions.150 
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Historically, and with a significant legacy, environmental malagnogenesis has operated 
synergistically with racism and bigotry.151 Environmental risks were/are pushed into areas that 
could/can be written off, where they could/can be disappeared into bodies that did not/do not count. 
The motives of those who embrace malagnogenesis in the service of racist, bigoted, sexist, etc., 
ends are fairly easy to explicate and condemn. Furthermore, the disparate impacts of pollution are 
somewhat easier to identify than pervasive disparate impacts in other areas, because pollution 
tends to leave a mark. Still, as modernity struggles to define itself as post-racial,152 social 
mechanisms for the maintenance of malagnogenesis are becoming more complex. In the past we 
may have sought to forget the humanity of the people exposed to harm. In our modern neoliberal 
nature and society we simply forget the harm. Adding insult to injury, even the resulting 
deprivation is cynically leveraged to serve the ends of accumulation agents via things like 
brownfield credits. The agnogenesis embraced by elites becomes malagnogenesis, perpetrated by 
and upon all. 
In this context, let us reconsider phase one discussed earlier. As the falsity of Robert 
Kehoe’s claims about ‘background exposure’ and ‘normal levels’ was revealed, people were made 
aware that exposures to leaded gasoline were subject to a kind of “boomerang effect.”153 This led 
to a situation that saw, as Ulrich Beck put it, the “agents of modernization themselves emphatically 
caught in the maelstrom of hazards they unleash(ed) and profit(ed) from.”154 Through the progress 
of scientific understanding, the risks associated with lead contamination were re-situated in the 
lived experience of those “agents of modernization,” and their agnogenesis could no longer prevail. 
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Suburbanization was the “spatial-fix”155 dictated by capitalist imperatives, but that was a long, 
drawn out process. In the meantime, predominantly white middle and upper class families who 
remained in cities demanded and received regulatory intervention. Crucially, the spatial and 
temporal inconvenience of lead exposures pushed those initial regulatory interventions toward a 
broader solution, the benefits of which were necessarily shared by all. The subsequent (slower) 
spatial fix was influenced by what Robert Kirkman called “limits of efficacy” and “limits of 
agency”156 which resulted in predictably uneven redistributions of risk/harm/exposure. Once the 
spatial fix was complete, the ongoing harm was neatly resituated in nature, and comfortably 
ignored. In this way, the agnogenesis of people like Robert Kehoe was replaced with the 
malagnogenesis that prevails in our modern neoliberal nature and society. 
As the old saying goes, history repeats itself, first as tragedy, second as farce.157 Subject 
only to the small matters of intractable economic constraints and insurmountable racist housing 
policies, dysfunctional accumulation agents are free to choose whether or not to expose their 
children to lead contamination. In the U.S. in 2012, there were almost ten thousand new cases of 
children under the age of five who exhibited a blood lead level greater than or equal to ten 
micrograms per deciliter of blood, which is double the current CDC reference level.158 For 
marginalized populations denied access to the suburban spatial fix, the ‘blame the victim’s mother’ 
paradigm still prevails.159 Unsurprisingly, the vicissitudes of phase two are still largely confined 
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to poor and minority populations.160 The malagnogenesis of our neoliberal rationality neatly 
redefines these harmed populations as at-risk. Harm is made to disappear by leveraging an 
imaginary agency. Risk is thus re-situated outside society and normalized. This gentle tyranny of 
false agency must be identified, explicated, and repudiated. This cognitive leap is harder to make, 
and to bridge the gap we seek out a qualified storyteller. 
Post-Racial Malagnogenesis and the Media 
 
Exposing environmental malagnogenesis is vital to encouraging prudential regulatory 
interventions. This process requires the participation of an intrepid, independent media apparatus. 
Unfortunately, the traditional role of the media is increasingly undermined by its financialization 
as well. The title of Robert McChesney’s recent book with John Nichols suggests what is at 
stake.161 To further illustrate this trend, C.W. Anderson commented on the changing media 
landscape by following two major Philadelphia papers as they moved their reporting online. The 
story he tells is one driven by the neoliberalization of the newsroom, one of the last bastions to 
resist the broader financialization of public life. He draws our attention to a “sped up news time,”162 
where on the web, “your deadline is every minute.”163 Everything is driven by “constant metrics 
of page views”164 and journalistic depth is traded for sensation. These observations are consistent 
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with  broader  trends  toward  the  “annihilation  of  space  by  time,”165   which  are  convergent 
phenomena intrinsic to the functioning of mature capitalism and its drive to speed up all life. The 
story told by Anderson prominently positions the Internet as a catalyzing agent in that annihilation. 
As change management and implementation processes are governed by the dominant paradigm in 
a managerial sense as well, it should not be a surprise that advancements in communication and 
information technologies have altered the media landscape such that its traditional role is eroded. 
It is against this backdrop that we should understand the changing intermediary role of the 
media as it relates to the proliferation of malagnogenesis. Journalism professor Jay Rosen has 
identified a variety of objectivity failures in contemporary journalism that he traces to things like 
the “master narrative in journalism,”166 “he said, she said journalism,”167 and so on. Rosen also 
details the seductiveness of a rehashed Cartesian dualism in his explanation of the journalistic 
“view from nowhere:” 
When you have an obligation to remain outside the arena, it is also 
tempting to feel above the partisans who are struggling within that 
arena. (But then where else are they going to struggle?) You learn 
the attractions of a view from nowhere. The daily gift of detachment 
keeps giving, until you’re almost “above” anyone who tries to get 
too political with you, or at least in the middle with the microphone 
 
 
 
 
 
 
165 Harvey, D. (1989). The condition of postmodernity (Vol. 14). Blackwell. p.273. 
166 Rosen, J. (2003). PressThink Basics: The master narrative in journalism. Retrieved from: 
http://archive.pressthink.org/2003/09/08/basics_master.html     . 
167 Rosen, J. (2009). He Said, She Said Journalism: Lame Formula in the Land of the Active User. Retrieved from: 
http://archive.pressthink.org/2009/04/12/hesaid_shesaid.html 
53  
between warring factions. There’s power in that; and where there’s 
power, there’s attraction.168 (emphasis and parentheses in original) 
When reportage is inclined to grant arguments from “both sides” equal weight, evidence-based 
conclusions are held in the same regard as rumors and conspiracy theories. Furthermore, a sped- 
up news time fosters the use of reliable, consistent, and conventional sources for which a 
“structured access” can become “habitual access.”169 Unreliable, inconsistent, or unconventional 
sources fall victim to this dynamic, and exacerbate the problem identified by Philip Schlesinger, 
that “the media are structurally biased towards very powerful and privileged sources who become 
‘over-accessed’”170 Indeed, the aforementioned glance at Google News search results revealed 
story after story for which the sources were limited solely to criminologists and public officials. 
The interpretation and explanation of phase two exposures requires more context, a greater depth 
of research, more diversity of sources, and an outside the box approach. The neoliberalized 
newsroom allows none of these. According to Alison Anderson, 
Some news stories have a much greater likelihood of being covered 
than others because they accord with organizational norms, 
pressures, and routines and/or they possess particular conventional 
features.171 
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In light of this “conventional features” requirement, the title of Jessica Reyes 2007 paper; 
“Environmental Policy as Social Policy”172 is instructive. In a few words, it reveals the 
complicated and interdisciplinary nature of this issue, something that modern journalistic (and I 
might add, academic) practices are increasingly ill-equipped to deal with. Finally, it is important 
to remember that failings in media discourses may seem to arise for a variety of ambivalent 
reasons, but they are unambiguous in their effect. Neoliberalization of the newsroom creates the 
conditions in which malagnogenesis flourishes, as the deafening silence about phase two so clearly 
demonstrates. 
Malagnogenesis in the Cultural Apparatus 
 
Interestingly, many of these modern phenomena were predicted by social and cultural 
theorists of the mid-twentieth century. The most powerful commentary emerged from the 
Frankfurt School, where critiques of the “cultural apparatus” raised prescient concerns about the 
“the subordination of a general communications process to an increasingly powerful system of 
advertising and public relations.”173 This is consistent with the observations by Alison Anderson 
and Jay Rosen referenced above, and those of other contemporary media critics like Robert 
McChesney.174 Furthermore, it is worth considering the extent to which other aspects of the 
Frankfurt School’s cultural critique might be extended in the context of malagnogenesis. For 
example, Bertolt Brecht was a German playwright who, while not directly involved with the 
Frankfurt school, incorporated elements of its theory into his works. According to McChesney and 
John Bellamy Foster, Brecht believed that the cultural apparatus “functions, among other things, 
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to stabilize the existing social relations both politically and economically.”175 This insight recalls 
the “gentle tyranny of informal social control”176 alluded to earlier. Malagnogenesis appears at the 
intersection of the need of the cultural apparatus to stabilize social relations and the requisite need 
for risk to be normalized. Not only must risk(s) be made normal, but in the interest of stability, 
society must also forget or deny that the attendant harm even exists. To fulfill these needs in the 
interest of their funders and within the constraints of a neoliberalized newsroom, the idealized role 
of the media is, therefore, perverted. Rather than exposing malagnogenesis, the media 
disseminates it. 
The Policy / Expert / Science Nexus of Malagnogenesis 
 
In order to maintain malagnogenesis, the practices of knowledge producers and 
policymakers are necessarily perverted as well. Producers of knowledge, either in the sciences or 
in policy / expert roles, consciously and unconsciously exploit flawed relationships with the media 
to clear the way for malagnogenesis. That said, it should be noted that the perversion of knowledge 
and discourse practices in the service of malagnogenesis is a systemic diagnosis, and is not 
necessarily a suggestion of individual guilt or an attribution of agency where broader structural 
trends prevail. It is perfectly reasonable for an individual researcher or policymaker to respond to 
the incentive structures that shape their products, especially within a culture in the Sciences that 
discourages and punishes dissent.177 As homo-oeconomicus interprets the world around him/her 
through the lenses of PVD and as an entrepreneur of the self,178  the influence of a thousand 
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seemingly insignificant decisions cumulatively reinforces neoliberal nature and society. This is 
true not only in the outward sense, but inward as well. A neoliberal, financialized rationality erodes 
our individual capacity for a broader, more integrated understanding, something that this study 
will explore in much greater detail later on. The systemic effect of social inurement that results 
from malagnogenesis’ blinding us to pervasive disparate impacts is my overriding concern. 
Like any other knowledge practice, malagnogenesis is subject to the same biases that 
impact the performance of all science, as outlined in the critical perspectives of the Sociology of 
Scientific Knowledge and Actor Network Theory. Since the late 60s, sociologists of science have 
explained the intersections of science and society that now aid in the perpetuation of the 
malagnogenesis paradigm. Put simply, the unique cultures involved in the performance of science 
inevitably influence and even determine its outcomes. This brand of “hostile science,” as Donna 
Haraway called it, is: 
...rhetoric, a series of efforts to persuade relevant social actors that 
one’s manufactured knowledge is a route to a desired form of very 
objective power.179 
The performance of such hostile science gives rise to fortified cultures within the Sciences that 
work to undermine the production of new knowledge. The pervasiveness of neoliberal thought in 
academia and in the media only encourages and reinforces this dynamic. 
Actor Network Theory (ANT) scholars have attempted to strip away the definitional 
dichotomies that buttress modernity, to untangle “stable definitions of society that look like 
domination.”180 Instead, they focus purely on interactions between human and nonhuman actors 
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to shed light on phenomena like malagnogenesis. Bruno Latour has referred to this approach as an 
“actant-rhizome ontology”181 as part of an effort to remove any superfluous connotative 
associations. As a useful, but not well understood knowledge practice, agnogenesis is vulnerable 
to opportunistic manipulations via the creation of and adherence to alternate realities. In the case 
of phase two exposures, this allowed the rise in crime to be falsely attributed to cultural factors 
and racist mythologies of the ‘superpredator.’ Through this lens, the inertial forces mentioned 
earlier are understood to provide the incentive for actors to participate in malagnogenesis, which 
enables adherence to the preferred alternate reality. Meaning is constructed through relations, and 
as these inertial forces are entrenched, they style themselves as “history’s actors.”182 New 
knowledges are resisted as a challenge to the dominant paradigm, and evidence-based revelations 
are either irrelevant, or absorbed in parallel. With the reintroduction of an imputed agency, and 
judged on the basis of a disparate impact standard, malagnogenesis makes a systemic diagnosis of 
isolated symptoms that are otherwise happy to float in the ether, free of any connotation, free of 
any blame. 
The variety of ways in which the practice of the sciences can be shaped or perverted makes 
clear that the evolution of knowledge is not linear or deterministic. The personalities involved and 
their interests are important considerations.183 Episodes like these recall Ulrich Beck’s contention 
that: 
...research takes place under the Damocles’ sword of horrendous 
investments.  That  is  to  say,  scientific  dogma  flourishes  in  the 
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shadow of mega-risks. Mistakes that cost billions can no longer be 
admitted.184 
Couple this with widespread and increasingly dogmatic beliefs in “technological momentum,”185 
and these modernity-buttressing forces serve to reinforce the “obduracy of the city,”186 another 
manifestation of our inertial forces. In the case of the 1990s crime wave, broken windows policing 
strategies spawned exactly these kinds of inertial forces. Pro-broken windows politicians ran on 
‘tough on crime’ platforms, while academics debated the merits of broken windows and mass 
incarceration. Is it possible to financially quantify the merits of ten percent more police on the 
streets? Twenty percent more stop-and-frisk interactions? The false premises underlying these 
debates have especially led criminologists to miss the forest for the trees, but they are not alone. 
As Upton Sinclair so aptly put it: “It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his 
salary depends on his not understanding it.” This is the essence of malagnogenesis. 
An Example of Malagnogenesis 
 
I have already established that people in policy roles may benefit from malagnogenesis. It 
is beyond the scope of this research to enter into a detailed discussion about the political economy 
of neoliberal policymakers, suffice it to say that the service and maintenance of the status quo they 
perpetuate exhibits a heavy reliance on malagnogenesis. Earlier, I touched on the role of the Bush 
administration in 2002, which was happy to exploit doubts about ‘background levels’ to leave 
unchanged the CDC reference level for lead. Similarly, the growing literature surrounding the 
industry-funded  doubts  about  the  science  of  climate  change  is  vast,  and  conforms  to  the 
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malagnogenesis hypothesis. To illustrate the power of malagnogenesis to influence the creation 
and dissemination of knowledge, I now turn to an example that is less transparently nefarious. 
In a recent article by Inmai Chettiar in The Atlantic, the lead / violence link is raised.187 
Chettiar’s article is a summary of a report from the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU called 
“What Caused the Crime Decline?”188 Chettiar’s take differs somewhat from other media sources 
in that it prominently mentions the lead / violence link in the fourth paragraph. Still, it is mentioned 
only in the context of the many theories about crime reduction that “abound,” as one of the many 
“novel explanations” that seem to pop up every year. What explains the dismissiveness? One 
possibility is that the Brennan Center’s research team for the report was entirely made up of 
criminologists and economists. In this way, the Brennan Center seems to fall into the same source 
selection trap as the mainstream media. This hypothesis is granted further credence by some 
additional shortfalls. Despite its title, the report assumes an advocacy position and argues for it. 
Rather than offering wide-ranging explanations for “What Caused the Crime Decline?” the report 
seems to be more interested in arguing that mass incarceration did not cause the crime decline, 
though this conclusion also conforms to the lead / violence hypothesis. Chettiar’s summary charts 
show lead as having had a small (<20%) effect on crime reductions from 1990-1999, and “likely 
no effect” on crime reductions from 2000-2013. This is directly contradicted by the other studies 
mentioned earlier, and would seem to ignore the eighteen to twenty-two year time lag identified 
by other researchers. Leaded gasoline was finally banned in 1986, but children exposed to lead 
emissions in the early 1980s were only in their late teens or early twenties by the oughts. Indeed, 
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it would appear that the Brennan Center report could have benefitted from the inclusion of experts 
from a broader array of disciplines than just economics and criminology. 
People in policy and outside expert roles work closely with people engaged in the 
production of knowledge, and like the media, they may perpetuate or facilitate malagnogenesis. 
As evidenced in the aforementioned report, even seemingly well intentioned researchers may fall 
victim to this dynamic. Incentive structures point researchers toward engagement with the 
controversy. When the controversy itself is built on false premises, striking only at the branches 
risks the flourishing of the root. As demonstrated earlier, this dynamic is on constant display in 
criminology literatures. Policymakers exploit their relationships(s) with the people responsible for 
producing knowledge to take advantage of the trend identified by Steve Fuller that: 
...the invocation of scientific findings, almost any findings will do, 
has turned out to be the most ideologically palatable means of 
coercing the populace.189 
Furthermore, given the revolving door between government and industry, and the overwhelming 
financial reliance of knowledge producers on both parties, it is increasingly difficult to draw any 
meaningful distinction between the interests of any of those groups. Our discursive disability is 
deeply held indeed. 
Lessons from Phase Two 
 
With this new perspective, I now briefly return to the earlier discussion of the precautionary 
principle. Suppose we could rewrite history, and the precautionary principle had been at the 
forefront during that single day conference in 1925. Could the ‘vast experiment’ have been 
avoided? Perhaps some version of the CDC reference level could have been introduced, and 
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perhaps the levels of lead introduced into gasoline could have been limited to some smaller 
amount. The advanced technology used today to measure micrograms of exposure in blood did not 
yet exist, so it would have been impossible to measure blood lead levels at the current, inadequate, 
reference level. Evidence from later experience doesn’t bode well either. When it was established, 
the CDC’s lead reference level was initially set at 60 micrograms per deciliter of blood. As the 
passage of time and the increasing sophistication of measurement technologies revealed ever more 
manifestations of harm, subsequent years saw the reference level progressively lowered all the 
way to five micrograms. It seems that any practical interpretation of the principle in the 1920s 
could have only had the effect of preventing isolated incidences of lead poisoning, not the 
widespread low-level exposures that characterize phase two. To be sure, a stronger adherence to 
the precautionary principle would have been preferable, but avoidance of phase two would have 
only been possible had lead additives been avoided altogether. In this instance, anything but the 
strongest interpretation of the precautionary principle was inadequate. If the principle could not 
have conceivably been relied upon to correctly answer “probably the greatest single question in 
the field of public health that has ever faced the American public,”190 it is worth wondering about 
its utility as an organizing principle. At best, reliance on the precautionary principle would seem 
to relegate environmental advocates to a perpetually defensive posture, assuming the Sisyphean 
task of attempting to beat back the “religion of our day,” the “belief in progress and productive 
forces.”191 At worst, the use of the precautionary principle as a rhetorical device may be doing 
more  harm  than  good.  I  have  no  doubt  that  it  was  conceived  of,  and  that  its  sporadic 
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implementation was undertaken with the noblest of intentions. That said, does ‘weak precaution’ 
substantially differ from ‘proceed with caution?’ 
Proceed (with caution) into the Metabolic Rift 
 
The lesson from recent policy debates about phase two exposures is clear. In neoliberal 
nature and society, policy interventions must be financialized, and the benefits captured by private 
interests. Where benefits from the amelioration of harm cannot be captured by private interests 
(a.k.a. where markets fail), the neoliberal state is tasked with creating the conditions in which that 
will occur. Neoliberal management of pollution therefore couples remediation initiatives with 
private development, as seen in the brownfield credits referenced in the quote in the introduction 
to this study. The implication of this kind of policy is devastating: pollution in potentially valuable 
areas is easily financialized, and transformed into diamonds. Pollution in less valuable areas simply 
disappears until these ‘market failures’ can be fixed, and the benefits from remediation can be 
captured by private interests. For the neoliberal state, any truly altruistic state-led prevention or 
amelioration of harm could also be understood as the preemptive and unnecessary destruction of 
value. The tortured logic of neoliberal rationality may be difficult to follow, but it is much easier 
to grasp with the recognition that it necessitates a disassociation with one’s humanity. If we fail to 
shed light on the true costs of this kind of policy in the plain terms granted by a disparate impact 
perspective, we risk the gradual normalization of odious phenomena.192 This has in fact been the 
case: the prevailing malagnogenesis with regard to phase two exposures has shifted attention away 
from the staggering social costs of the vast experiment. Thus I reiterate my contention that 
neoliberal agnogenesis is better labeled malagnogenesis. 
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Unsurprisingly, the legacy of seven million tons of neurotoxic metals having been 
dispersed throughout the most densely populated areas in the U.S. has produced a quite wide 
metabolic rift. We have seen how costly that rift has been in terms of lower earnings and lower 
IQs, but above all in polluted bodies and contaminated citizens. Furthermore, multiple recent 
studies have concluded that phase two lead exposures are capable of explaining between 60% and 
90% of the urban crime wave in the late 20th century, yet this is left unsaid and rendered 
unknowable. This is the danger of malagnogenesis. Systemic institutional reinforcement of false 
dichotomies and their resultant metabolic rifts open up knowledge gaps. These are also properly 
viewed as gaps in power; a vacuum that cannot stand because other power/knowledge regimes 
move to fill the vacuum.193 As evidence of the requisite harm perpetuated by the alternate reality 
of neoliberal rationality mounts, inertial forces resist via agnogenesis their replacement. As others 
have pointed out, the costs associated with many environmental problems far outweigh other issues 
that receive a great deal more attention, funding, etc.194 Finally, I should note that malagnogenesis 
is not limited exclusively to pollution or environmental issues. The production of ignorance that 
normalizes harm for and amongst marginalized populations is on constant display in neoliberal 
nature and society. Everything from financial crises,195 to national security, education, healthcare, 
gun policy,196 climate change and more all exhibit neoliberal agnogenesis that could be better 
described as malagnogenesis. This pernicious discursive failure is worthy of further explication. 
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The Farce of Progress in Mature Capitalism 
 
Phase one lead exposures repeated some very sad history as tragedy, and the current 
manifestation of malagnogenesis in response to ongoing phase two exposures is an outright farce. 
Even if one were to argue that normalization of some harm is necessary for progress in an uncertain 
world, the farce comes quickly into view when we recall that ‘progress’ in neoliberal nature and 
society is mediated strictly by the financial. Recent revelations of a persistent racial “value gap” 
suggest that financialized distributions of risk are governed by inherently flawed mechanisms, 
guaranteed to be uneven and unfair. As Eddie S. Glaude put it in his recent book, Democracy in 
Black: 
...it hardly matters what form our laws and politics take. They may 
create a framework for equality, but the value gap will always rig 
the outcomes.197 
In the case of lead exposures, the farce is particularly stark. Not only is it still the case that the next 
child found with elevated blood lead levels is exceedingly likely to be black and/or poor, but 
gasoline lead additives were never even necessary to begin with. According to Jamie Kittman: 
The benefits of lead antiknock additives were wildly and knowingly 
overstated in the beginning, and continue to be. Lead is not only bad 
for the planet and all its life forms, it is actually bad for cars and 
always was.198 
Instead, Kittman posits that the introduction of lead additives was a craven, strategic move 
designed to secure a competitive advantage for gasoline relative to ethanol. In the short and 
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medium term, the use of leaded gasoline was a resounding success for the bottom line of car 
culture. Massive social costs that manifested in the long term appear neither on the balance sheet 
of the private interests in question, nor in contemporary public discourse. Sadly, even as this study 
was being conducted, the validity of the malagnogenesis approach was being confirmed, as several 
thousand additional casualties were revealed in Flint, Michigan. That episode has again made clear 
that risk/harm neoliberal nature and society will always rest on the backs of and be carried in the 
bodies of marginalized populations. Tragically, as was the case with leaded gasoline, the poisoning 
of Flint was easily avoidable and unnecessary. According to several reports, the public water 
supply could have easly been rendered safe with the introduction of a harmless anti-corrosion 
additive, at the minimal cost of about $100 per day.199 It is worth contemplating whether the 
thousands of unfortunate children in Flint would have been so callously exposed to lead, had there 
been a more robust discourse about the true costs of widespread lead exposures. The fact that we 
still do not have that discourse is both determined by and determines the status of certain 
populations as marginalized. As noted earlier, social stratification is increasingly determined by 
one’s disposition relative to risk. Put another way, malagnogenesis feeds, and in turn is fed by the 
value gap. As Farhana Sultana put it, “health and well-being are complex and evolving in instances 
where slow poisoning is simultaneously an outcome of development endeavors and environmental 
factors.”200 For the at-risk who were and are subjected to a vast, involuntary experiment of 
completely unnecessary lead exposures, the relationship between health and development 
endeavors in neoliberal nature is complex indeed. 
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The Paradox of Risk and the Paradox of the Disposable 
 
It is well known that capitalist laws of motion produce the difference and uneven 
development that characterizes so much of life in mature capitalism. Coupling this knowledge with 
an understanding of the fraught relationship between development endeavors and the risks of slow 
poisoning, other recent assessments of neoliberal nature and society have concluded that 
neoliberalism has refashioned large parts of society into “disposable populations.”201 In one sense 
this conclusion is correct: neoliberal rationality does indeed treat large segments of society as if 
they are disposable. The repulsive manifestations of that attitude are easily condemned, but they 
mask a more pernicious trait inherent to our modern neoliberal nature and society. The recognition 
that ‘disposable’ populations are actually redefined by neoliberal rationality as at-risk suggests a 
different conclusion. In our neoliberal nature and society, marginalized / disposable / at-risk 
populations must fulfill their neoliberal destiny: they are transformed into vessels charged with 
bearing socially useful risks. Recall that: 
The history of the emergence and operationalization of risk has 
therefore always been situated at the intersection of capital and rule. 
Rule seeks to secure governability. Capital seeks to profit. Risk 
combines the two in posing and securing subjects of self-rule not 
simply in conditions of uncertainty but in terms of measuring their 
exposure to contingency financially.202 
Thus, just as the paradox of risk arises, so too does the paradox of disposable populations that exist 
as essential vessels for risk. The agnogenesis of phase one was driven by early-stage “roll-back” 
neoliberalism: hostile sciences fought for a version of the truth calibrated to engineer the liberation 
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of capital at the expense of disposable populations. The malagnogenesis of phase two produces a 
version of the truth that manufactures circulation opportunities for capital, thus aiding in the “roll- 
out” stage of neoliberalism.203 “Roll-out” neoliberalism perpetuates the aforementioned process of 
bioeconomics, in which disposable populations are essential. 
Other literatures devoted to the resilience of neoliberalism have positioned it as exhibiting 
resilience to or taking advantage of risk.204 Contrary to these literatures, the new understanding of 
neoliberal nature and society gleaned from my investigation of the two phases of lead exposure in 
urban areas in the U.S. tells us that neoliberalism actually does not have any disposition relative 
to risk at all. Neoliberal nature and society produces risk, eats risk, becomes indistinguishable from 
risk. Risk is normalized, and seeming natural, it escapes judgement. Homo-oeconomicus, down on 
his/her luck, plays the part of a dysfunctional accumulation agent: one who is capable of 
accumulating but not capitalizing on risks. PVD and financialization in the mind of the neoliberal 
subject function to stabilize social relations in the way hypothesized by the critique of the Frankfurt 
School. Dysfunctional accumulation agents are made to bear uneven distributions of risk while 
waiting to be devoured, remade, and devoured all over again by a neoliberal nature and society. 
Structures, systems and practices like malagnogenesis that perpetuate this vicious cycle of 
neoliberal destiny must be renegotiated. 
Homo-oeconomicus: The Ultimate Uncooperative Commodity 
 
The long running debate about the financialization of nature and the commodification of 
all is in need of an update. Wendy Brown’s excellent Undoing the Demos is a great first step, 
especially in her characterization of neoliberal rationality as furthering the transformation of homo- 
politicus into homo-oeconomicus. I have referenced this dynamic several times, because of the 
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importance of what it reveals about our historical moment. If Brown’s assessment is correct, the 
effects of this transformation may first become evident in the manifestations of cognitive 
detachment encouraged by this philosophy of false dichotomies, this cynicism of useful divisions 
that I have discussed in the context of malagnogenesis. Where I believe Brown’s critique falls 
short, or rather, where it deserves to be extended and expanded, is outside of the political and 
educational realms. Our neoliberal nature and society sets forces in motion, and establishes 
powerful incentive structures to blind and inure us to the resulting harm. Homo-oeconomicus, 
whose view of the world is so heavily skewed by financialization and a nonsensical present value 
discounting, greases the wheels for the bioeconomic management of society. It is only through 
malagnogenesis that this could be possible. Could the identification of malagnogenesis in action 
hold the key to undermining the entrenchment of bioeconomics? 
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Chapter Two 
Method 
Research Questions 
 
Research Question One: Is malagnogenesis, or the production of ignorance that normalizes 
harm for and amongst marginalized populations, a current and identifiable phenomenon in 
academia? 
This question was addressed via an investigation of the practices and experiences of knowledge 
producers in criminology as they addressed (or failed to address) significant findings pertinent to 
their area of study from other disciplines. I approached the question of malagnogenesis in 
criminology as it relates to the role of leaded gasoline in the crime wave of the late 20th century, 
and the concurrent implementation of broken windows policing strategies. 
Research Question Two: Does neoliberal rationality influence malagnogenesis? 
 
This question was investigated concurrently with research question one. As the experiences of 
criminologists in regard to the lead / violence link were assessed, I also assessed their level of 
agreement with certain generally accepted neoliberal themes. Assessment of an individual’s 
adherence to neoliberal rationality was guided by the “Thirteen Commandments” of neoliberalism 
as proposed by Philip Mirowski.205 
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Study Design 
 
From Narag et al.206 and my review of the recent literature, it is clear that the lead / violence 
link has not been adequately dealt with in criminological literatures. Meanwhile, broken windows 
policing strategies have benefitted from a long running and rather slanted discourse.207 To that end, 
this research sought to probe the outlines of malagnogenesis by surveying criminologists’ 
involvement with and perceptions of each. To be perfectly clear: this research is based in an 
understanding that broken windows policing strategies are regularly given credit for phenomena 
that could be much better explained by the lead / violence link. There are a number of possible 
explanations for this failing, and this research attempted to tease them out. The silence of 
criminologists on this issue might simply be the result of ignorance. That scenario is easy to 
measure and understand. On the other hand, criminologists who are aware of the lead / violence 
link might have been discouraged via a variety of mechanisms from acting on that awareness. That 
is to say, in the research practices of criminologists, malagnogenesis may flourish in the gap 
between general and exclusive knowledge. That scenario is somewhat harder to measure, and this 
study attempted to shed light on that dynamic. To that end, a survey was designed to collect 
information about research practices and individual adherence to neoliberal rationality. Questions 
about neoliberal rationality were designed as a construct, yielding a score for each respondent. To 
the best of my knowledge, this study is the first to include this kind of Neoliberal Rationality 
Construct (NRC). My hope is that this measure may help to reveal some possible reasons for the 
perpetuation and dissemination of malagnogenesis. 
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The specific method used to carry out this study was an online survey administered via the 
Qualtrics survey interface. All responses were blind to the researcher, with identifying information 
never connected to individual responses. These kinds of online surveys are renowned for 
statistically significant lower response rates and in some cases even significantly different results 
than other types of surveys.208 The technique(s) used for this survey sought to mitigate those 
shortcomings in several ways. The respondents were academics. The benefits of a sample 
population made up of academics are many. According to Alexander Bogner et al, research 
involving expert subjects tends to exhibit the following features; 
(1) A shared understanding of the social relevance of the research 
can then often be assumed, largely eliminating the need for further 
justification, (2) A number of secondary motivating factors also 
make it comparatively easy to encourage and motivate experts to 
participate in such interviews, (3) the professionalism of people 
familiar with being in the public eye, (4) silent awareness of the 
scientific and/or political relevance of their field of activity or 
personal achievements, (5) the desire to help “make a difference” – 
no matter how small, (6) professional curiosity about the topic and 
field of research, and (7) an interest in sharing one’s thoughts and 
ideas with an external expert.209 
Indeed, it appears that these seven ‘goodwill criteria’ helped to increase the rate and quality of the 
responses garnered from the surveys. The survey was also designed to be very brief, including 
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fewer than thirty multiple choice questions. It was anticipated that participation would take less 
than five minutes in total, and this was borne out in the responses. 
Survey 
 
This survey included five topics, with three to eight questions dedicated to each topic. The 
topics were; (1) demographics, (2a) neoliberal rationality construct, (2b) research practices, (3) 
broken windows policing and (4) lead / violence link. First, demographic data were collected. The 
demographic data component included five questions. Other than this general demographic data, 
all survey answers were completed anonymously. Next, the respondents were broken into three 
equal groups. Each group received the same survey questions, but in a slightly different order. 
Table Two below shows how the order of questions differed for each group: 
 
 
Manipulation of the survey order was hypothesized to reveal that certain questions might exhibit 
a ‘priming’ effect whereby subsequent answers were affected. One of the central understandings 
of this study is that broken windows is a manifestation of neoliberal rationality in policing 
strategies. Hence, questions about neoliberal rationality were hypothesized to prime more positive 
responses about broken windows policing. 
Substantive questions were all in the form of either False / True, multiple choice, or a Likert 
scale. Likert scale responses took the form of 1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree. Multiple 
choice questions accepted multiple answers. Questions used for the neoliberal rationality construct 
targeted some characteristics of neoliberal rationality identified earlier in this study, including (1) 
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present value discounting, (2) “roll-out” neoliberalism, (3) entrepreneurialism of the self, (4) 
financialization, and (5) agency. The first four questions about research practices gauged 
interdisciplinarity in the perceptions and practices of the researcher. The remaining question asked 
for some potential reasons for a failure in knowledge dissemination. Finally, the researcher’s 
involvement with and opinion of broken windows policing and the lead / violence link were 
assessed. The last lead / violence question also asks for some potential reasons for a failure in 
knowledge dissemination. Questions are included as Appendix A. 
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Chapter Three 
Results 
Participant Demographics 
 
Data collection began on 6/29/16 and ended on 7/23/16. As anticipated, in order to return 
a sufficient number of responses, it was necessary to expand the survey to several states from its 
initial focus on Florida. Ultimately, the survey was distributed to 1,394 publicly available email 
addresses at colleges and universities in five states: Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, Alabama, and 
South Carolina. The overall response rate was 13.49% (n = 188), with 93.62% (n = 176) 
completing the entire survey. This represents a robust response rate for an online survey, and 
supports the earlier arguments about the potential benefits of a survey population in academia. 
Inclusion criteria required that each respondent be an active researcher in criminology of some 
sort. As departmental naming conventions and organizational makeups are somewhat variable, 
respondents were asked to confirm that they are a criminologist, or that their research involves the 
study of crime. Of the 188 surveys collected, 38 respondents indicated that they are not 
criminologists, and were excluded from the analysis. Thus, the survey population used for the 
analysis consisted of 150 criminologists from the southeastern U.S. Male and female respondents 
were split evenly, with 75 of each. The most common age group was the 30-39 range, which made 
up 31.33% (n = 47) of the sample. There was a strong prevalence of White respondents, who made 
up 88.08% (n = 133) of the sample. Finally, Tenured (n = 46) and Tenure Track (n = 46) positions 
combined to make up a majority of the sample, while Adjunct Professors (n = 24) and Other Non- 
75  
Tenure Academics (n = 22) were also large groups. Table Three shows a full summary of the 
demographics of the survey population. 
 
 
Neoliberal Rationality Construct 
 
Respondents varied a great deal on the NRC, with a minimum score of 1.4 and a maximum 
score of 7. Higher NRC scores indicate a stronger adherence to neoliberal rationality. The NRC 
mean was 4.48 (M = 4.48, SD = 1.20). Descriptive statistics for all survey variables are included 
as Table Twenty Seven. A test of Cronbach’s Alpha (CA) was conducted to assess the reliability 
of the construct. The NRC generated from these five questions had a CA value of .80, which 
identifies it as a reliable construct. CA values above .70 are considered acceptable, and the ideal 
range for CA is between .80 and .95.210 All five questions contributed to the reliability of the 
construct. It should be noted that CA values closer to one are not necessarily desirable. CA values 
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very close to one suggest that individual questions are not capturing any variation among the 
respondents. See Table Four below for details of the CA calculation. 
 
 
Broken Windows and Lead / Violence 
 
Perceptions of the effectiveness of broken windows policing were mixed. When asked 
whether broken windows policing had a significant impact on recent reductions in crime, there 
was a notable lack of consensus (M = 4.05, SD = 1.81). Slightly less than one quarter (n = 35) of 
respondents reported having published any research (henceforth “academic” involvement) about 
broken windows policing. A similar number (n = 36) reported that they had been interviewed 
about, consulted on, or in some other capacity been involved (henceforth “real world” 
involvement) with the implementation of broken windows policing strategies. 
On the issue of a potential lead / violence link, there was more consensus. When asked 
whether the removal of lead from gasoline had a significant impact on recent reductions in crime, 
few respondents indicated agreement (M = 3.39, SD = 1.44). The number of respondents who 
indicated that they “Strongly Agree” (n = 3) or “Agree” (n = 4) was also very low. This question 
evinced a very high incidence of “Neither Agree nor Disagree” responses: a majority of all 
respondents (n = 76) indicated no opinion. Accordingly, very few respondents reported having; A) 
conducted any research in collaboration with an environmental policy expert (n = 11), B) published 
any research that mentioned a lead / violence link (n = 2), or C) any interest in conducting research 
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on the lead / violence link (n = 9). It should be noted that though the small sample size of 
respondents answering this set of questions in the affirmative is revealing in itself, it also made it 
difficult to use that subset of responses to draw any successive conclusions. 
Research Practices 
 
Broadly speaking, the respondents considered themselves to be highly interdisciplinary in 
their research practices. When asked whether they “actively attempt to integrate findings from 
other disciplines,” respondents leaned heavily toward “Agree” (M = 6.16, SD = 0.94). Respondents 
also largely agreed that when their research hypotheses are not borne out, they “cast a wide net, 
including into other disciplines, in search of alternate explanations” (M = 5.55, SD = 1.25). 
Interestingly, on questions that introduced a degree of specificity, the consensus was weakened 
but retained directionality. Respondents mostly disagreed that “Crime is a narrowly defined 
phenomenon, and can be studied as such” (M = 2.66, SD = 1.71),211 and respondents mostly agreed 
that “The environmental determinants of crime include things like pollution” (M = 5.00, SD = 
1.52). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
211 Directionality on this question was reversed relative to the other questions about research practices, with a lower 
score indicating that the respondent endorsed the interdisciplinary view. If directionality is reversed, the observed 
mean is consistent with the other questions in this block (M = 5.34, SD = 1.71). 
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Chapter Four 
Analysis and Discussion 
Several types of analysis were conducted to evaluate the research questions and 
hypotheses. As mentioned above, simple descriptive statistics are included as Table Twenty Seven. 
Pearson correlations are included as Table Twenty Eight. Potential differences stemming from the 
order in which the survey questions were presented were examined with a series of one-way, 
between subjects ANOVAs. These results were not significant, though there was evidence of 
variation in the direction(s) hypothesized earlier in this research. It is possible that subsequent 
surveys providing greater power may reveal that these trends are, in fact, significant. These 
analyses are included, but due to the lack of any robust statistical significance, the subject is not 
addressed any further. The discussion below includes many, but not all, of the significant 
relationships discovered via this analysis. 
Broken Windows 
 
Respondents endorsing the significance of broken windows policing strategies in crime 
reduction were significantly older (r = .24, p < .01), and were more likely to report some level of 
“real world” involvement with broken windows policing (r = .30, p < .001). These respondents 
were also more likely to agree that crime is a narrowly defined phenomenon (r = .18, p < .05), and 
were more likely to report that a lack of demand is one constraint on interdisciplinary research (r 
= .17, p < .05). Given the mass of highly cited literature on broken windows policing strategies, I 
expected the respondents to demonstrate a significant involvement with them, both academic and 
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otherwise. The number of respondents who reported an “academic” involvement with broken 
windows research was somewhat lower than expected (n = 35). There are a number of possible 
explanations for this, including the phrasing of the question itself. It is possible that criminologists 
who have conducted research having to do with things like “community policing,” “zero tolerance” 
policies, and “policing disorder” strategies may consider them in distinct categories, as opposed to 
their all falling under the umbrella category of “broken windows policing.” Additionally, the 
largely negative connotation associated with certain broken windows policing strategies may 
discourage some researchers from identifying with it as part of a broader research program. In any 
case, those who reported an “academic” involvement with broken windows policing were also 
more likely to report some level of “real world” involvement with broken windows policing (r = 
.32, p < .001). These respondents were also more likely to have published on the lead / violence 
link (r = .21, p < .05), were more likely to be interested in publishing on the lead / violence link (r 
= .26, p < .01), and were less likely to cite a lack of demand for lead / violence research (r = -.26, 
p < .01). Finally, those who reported some level of “real world” involvement with broken windows 
policing were on average older (r = .25, p < .01) and more male (r = -.28, p < .001). 
Though the number of respondents who reported having published on broken windows 
policing (n = 35) and who reported some level of “real world” involvement (n = 36) were similar, 
a cross-tabulation of the makeup of these groups was useful. It is reasonable to expect that any 
academic who has been, for example, interviewed about broken windows policing should also 
have some history of publishing on the subject. Thus, in an ideal world, the correlation between 
these two variables would be close to one. In fact, of the 36 respondents who reported a “real 
world” involvement with broken windows policing, only seventeen reported an “academic” 
involvement. Simple arithmetic reveals nineteen respondents who reported some level of “real 
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world” involvement while lacking any “academic” involvement in the subject. See Table Five 
below for a summary of this cross-tabulation. It may also be interesting to note here that of the 35 
respondents  who  have  the  most  favorable  (“Agree”  or  “Strongly  Agree”)  opinion  of  the 
significance  of  broken  windows  policing,  eighteen  reported  some  level  of  “real  world” 
involvement. It would seem that an academic’s opinion about the efficacy of broken windows 
policing might be as good a predictor of their “real world” involvement with it (r = .30, p < .001) 
as their actually being an active researcher (r = .32, p < .001) on that issue. This disparity is 
somewhat  confounding,  and  provides  the  first  evidence  of  one  (or  nineteen)  source(s)  of 
malagnogenesis in academia. This finding also lends support to earlier arguments about certain 
“source selection” problems in the media and elsewhere that allows potentially unreliable sources 
to be over-accessed. Who are these (older, more male) over-privileged sources of malagnogenesis? 
 
 
It could be that the difference in “real world” involvement with broken windows policing 
stems from an individual’s employment status. After all, individuals come to academia from a 
variety of other careers, and it is possible that the category of Other Non-Tenure Academics may 
be less likely to publish on broken windows policing than, say, Tenured Professors, while 
possessing some other source of reasonable authority on the subject. For example, a retired police 
detective now teaching courses on forensics might not have published any research on broken 
81  
windows policing, but still might be able to claim some authority on the subject. In order to 
investigate this possibility, a one-way between subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare any 
potential effect of employment status. Four groups were sufficiently large to be compared: Tenured 
Professors (n = 46), Tenure-Track Professors (n = 46), Adjunct Professors (n = 24), and Other 
Non-Tenure Academics (n = 22).212 There was a significant effect (p < .01) of employment status 
on perceptions of the effectiveness of broken windows policing [F(3, 132) = 4.45]. Post hoc 
comparisons using the Tukey HSD test revealed that the mean score for Tenured Professors (M = 
4.27, SD = 1.85) and Adjunct Professors (M = 4.61, SD = 1.64) were both significantly higher than 
that of Tenure-Track Professors (M = 3.24, SD = 1.72). Put another way, it seems that Tenured 
Professors and Adjunct Professors are both more likely than Tenure-Track Professors to 
overemphasize the effectiveness of broken windows policing. See Table Six below for the details 
of the ANOVA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
212 Smaller groups (Graduate Student, Non-academic, and Other) were excluded. 
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There was also a significant effect (p < .001) of employment status on “academic” 
involvement with broken windows policing [F(3, 132) = 7.33]. In this case, post hoc comparisons 
using the Tukey HSD test revealed that the mean score for Tenured Professors (M = 1.42, SD = 
.50) was significantly higher than the mean score for all other occupation categories. Put another 
way, in this sample Tenured Professors were more likely than all other occupation categories to 
have had some “academic” involvement with broken windows policing. See Table Seven below 
for the details of this ANOVA. That said, there was no significant effect (p > .15) of employment 
status on “real world” involvement with broken windows policing. Of course, it should be noted 
that there is some danger in drawing any meaningful conclusions from a catch-all category like 
“Other Non-Tenure Academic.” In any case, this part of the analysis was useful if only to reject 
the hypothesis that employment status was the source of any identifiable difference in “real world” 
involvement. 
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Lead / Violence 
 
As discussed, Criminologists’ “academic” involvement with broken windows policing was 
somewhat lower (n = 35) than expected, but that figure is still much higher than the similar figure 
for the lead / violence link (n = 2). It is also interesting to note that even after a year in which lead 
exposure has been prominent in the news due to the contamination of drinking water in Flint, MI, 
so few (n = 9) of the respondents reported even having any interest in pursuing that kind of 
research. The low response rates here suggest that mechanisms for the maintenance of 
malagnogenesis in criminology remain strong. Evidence presented in Table One earlier suggested 
that prominent journals in criminology may play an enforcement role, but these responses also 
demonstrate a lack of interest. Despite the small sample sizes, some responses were revealing. 
Among those who endorsed the significance of a lead / violence link, that group was more likely 
to cite a lack of funding (r = .21, p < .05) and a lack of time (r = .16, p < .05) as constraints on that 
kind of research. As expected, some evidence that the neoliberalization of academia has reared its 
ugly head. Finally, those who have conducted research with an environmental policy expert were 
much more likely to have published on the lead / violence link (r = .41, p < .001). Unsurprisingly, 
they were also more likely to emphasize the importance of interdisciplinary research practices (r 
= .20, p < .05), and they were more likely to agree that the “environmental determinants of crime 
include things like pollution” (r = .21, p < .05). The benefits of a genuinely interdisciplinary 
approach are manifest. Still, in light of recent events and the existing literature on a lead / violence 
link, the numbers involved here are surprisingly low. This finding suggests that the assertion in 
Raymund Narag et al. that “to date, these findings have not been placed in the context of or 
integrated into criminological theory,”213 remains true today. 
 
213 Narag, R. E., Pizarro, J., and Gibbs, C. (2009). Lead exposure and its implications for criminological theory. 
Criminal Justice and Behavior, 36(9), 954-973. 
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That last conclusion is also supported by a comparison of the perceptions respondents hold 
about broken windows policing with that of the lead / violence link. As noted earlier, when asked 
whether broken windows policing had a significant impact on recent reductions in crime, there 
was a notable lack of consensus (M = 4.05, SD = 1.81). While that finding in itself is somewhat 
encouraging, when asked whether the removal of lead from gasoline had a significant impact on 
recent reductions in crime, few respondents indicated agreement (M = 3.39, SD = 1.44). For 
reasons discussed earlier, on this issue the perspective of criminologists seems to be precisely 
inverted. It is also revealing that nearly all responses (92.57%) to the question about broken 
windows policing reported some kind of opinion (i.e., only eleven respondents answered “Neither 
Agree nor Disagree”). Meanwhile, a majority (51.35%) of respondents to the question about the 
lead / violence link reported no opinion (i.e., 76 respondents answered “Neither Agree nor 
Disagree”). We know how to think about broken windows policing, but the same cannot be said 
of a potential lead / violence link. The pattern of these responses lends support to my earlier claim 
that we simply do not know how to think about these things anymore. This also supports my 
hypothesis with regard to research question one, that malagnogenesis is an identifiable 
phenomenon in academia. The pattern of responses elucidated thus far is troubling, while 
seemingly obvious explanations like employment status offer little clarity. To answer the larger 
question of why, I turn to the neoliberal rationality construct. 
Neoliberal Rationality Construct 
 
The NRC was significantly correlated with a number of other variables. See Table Twenty 
Eight for a complete inter-correlation matrix. As expected, the NRC exhibited a strongly positive 
correlation (r = .39, p < .001) with perceptions of the effectiveness of broken windows policing. 
Indeed, of all variables surveyed, a respondent’s NRC score was the single best predictor of their 
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perception of the effectiveness of broken windows policing. Better even, than any “real world” 
involvement (r = .30, p < .001), or “academic” involvement (no relationship). Simply put, the 
stronger an individual’s adherence to neoliberal rationality, the more likely they were to view 
broken windows policing as an effective crime reduction strategy. The relationship here presents 
some strong evidence in support of previous claims214 that broken windows policing is better 
understood as the imposition of a neoliberal conception of space onto the securitized city than as 
a crime fighting strategy. After all, they call it a policing disorder strategy for a reason. These 
conclusions, however, do not necessarily extend to criminologists’ perceptions of the lead / 
violence link. No significant relationships were discovered between NRC scores and any of the 
lead / violence variables. 
Earlier, I identified nineteen respondents who reported some level of “real world” 
involvement with broken windows policing, while lacking an “academic” involvement. As 
discussed, it should be reasonable to expect that any academic who exhibited some “real world” 
involvement with broken windows policing should also exhibit an “academic” involvement with 
the subject. Though these variables are indeed positively related (r = .32, p < .001), the earlier 
cross-tabulation of “academic” and “real world” involvement with broken windows policing 
revealed that the two are far from perfectly related. In addition to the aforementioned group of 
nineteen, there were eighteen respondents who exhibited an “academic” involvement and no “real 
world” involvement, and seventeen who exhibited both types of involvement. For clarification, 
see Table Eight below. 
 
 
 
 
 
214 Herbert, S., & Brown, E. (2006). Conceptions of space and crime in the punitive neoliberal city. Antipode, 38(4), 
755-777. p.757. 
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To shed some more light on these groups, a one-way between subjects ANOVA was 
conducted to compare NRC scores across these three groups.215 The findings here have the 
potential to be quite edifying. First, the analysis was valid: there is indeed a significant effect (p < 
.001) of group membership [F(2, 51) = 10.22]. Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test 
revealed that the mean NRC score for Group One (M = 5.43, SD = .94) was significantly higher 
than both Group 2 (M = 3.91, SD = .94), and Group 3 (M = 4.52, SD = 1.20). For those 
criminologists who are seemingly unqualified to engage in a “real world” involvement, a very high 
NRC score seems to act as a permission slip. For those criminologists who seem to be legitimately 
engaged with some “real world” involvement, an average NRC score seems to be a prerequisite. 
Finally, while this analysis cannot claim to have definitively proven that qualified voices are 
excluded from some “real world” involvement on the basis of their low NRC scores, it did suggest 
that the NRC score is a rather good indicator.216 See Table Nine below for the details of this 
ANOVA. Correlations bear all of this out as well: an individual with a higher NRC score is more 
 
215 Respondents answering both questions in the negative (n = 94) were excluded. 
216 The wording here is a bit tricky: though the G2 mean (M = 3.91) is lower than the G3 mean (M = 4.52), the 
ANOVA did not find that this relationship was significant, only that G1 was significantly higher than both G2 and 
G3. Present findings suggest that an analysis with more power likely would display a significant relationship  
between G2 and G3, but in the absence of that last relationship I can’t definitively say that G2 is excluded from “real 
world” involvement on the basis of the NRC score. Of course, other confounding variables are always a possibility  
as well. 
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likely (r = .25, p < .001) to exhibit some “real world” involvement with broken windows policing. 
There was no similar relationship observed between NRC scores and an “academic” involvement. 
These findings should ring some loud alarm bells. Academics’ “real world” involvement with 
broken windows policing seems to be governed more by ideology as a signaling mechanism than 
any legitimate academic engagement with the subject. 
 
 
Finally, this analysis found some evidence that an individual’s NRC score also impacts 
their research practices. I detailed earlier how broadly speaking, academics in criminology 
consider themselves to be quite interdisciplinary in their research practices. That said, when 
questions about interdisciplinarity are directly related to criminology, the relationship appears to 
weaken. The NRC score apparently explains this divergence. There was no observed relationship 
between NRC scores and the general interdisciplinarity of research practices. On those two 
questions, all respondents were equally likely to profess their interdisciplinarity. When some 
specificity was introduced, higher NRC sores were more likely to reject interdisciplinarity, 
narrowly defined. For example, those scoring higher on the NRC were more likely (r = .22, p < 
.01) to agree that “Crime is a narrowly defined phenomenon and can be studied as such” and were 
less likely (r = -.16, p < .05) to agree that “The environmental determinants of crime include things 
like pollution.” 
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With this last finding we can begin to understand the determinants of what constitutes 
general knowledge about, and exclusive knowledge within (neoliberal) criminology. Nearly all 
respondents, including those higher on the NRC, purport to embrace interdisciplinarity in their 
research practices. When some specificity is introduced, those scoring higher on the NRC seem to 
jettison their professed beliefs about interdisciplinarity. Unsurprisingly, the same people also tend 
to have a more positive opinion of broken windows policing, and are more likely to report some 
“real world” involvement with it. Chickens and eggs being what they are, the genesis of this 
phenomenon is difficult to pin down. Still, whether accomplished via selection, learned behaviors, 
or both, this finding lends some strong support to my hypothesis with regard to research question 
two, that adherence to neoliberal rationality influences malagnogenesis. 
Conclusion 
 
This study sought to define and explore an increasingly important neoliberal knowledge 
practice, which I have called malagnogenesis. Research question one, Is malagnogenesis, or the 
production of ignorance that normalizes harm for and amongst marginalized populations, a 
current and identifiable phenomenon in academia?, was primarily supported by three findings 
in this analysis. First, criminologists’ perceptions of, involvement with, and interest in broken 
windows policing all displayed persistent disparities when compared with that of a potential lead 
/ violence link. This suggests that malagnogenesis is indeed an identifiable phenomenon in 
criminology. Second, the prevalence of “Neither Agree nor Disagree” responses to the question 
about the role of leaded gasoline in crime reduction, combined with the persistent lack of any 
apparent interest in the subject both lend credence to the argument that we simply do not know 
how to talk (or think) about these things anymore.217 Continued evidence of such carefully curated 
 
 
217 Judt, T. (2011). Ill fares the land: a treatise on our present discontents. Penguin UK. p.34. 
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ignorance suggests that malagnogenesis is indeed a current phenomenon in academia. Third, the 
peculiar apparent determinants of criminologists’ “real world” involvement with broken windows 
policing are clearly troubling. Absent malagnogenesis, can we explain why a politico-economic 
ideology is a better predictor of “real world” involvement than academic expertise? This suggests 
that some practices aimed at the production and dissemination of knowledge in academia are 
indeed broken. Additionally, the role of the media in source selection should not be ignored, and 
needs to be repaired. Over-reliance on over-privileged, under-informed, and even self-deluded 
sources is a problem much deeper than any conflict of interest disclosure could root out. 
If self-delusion seems a bridge too far, research question two, Does neoliberal rationality 
influence malagnogenesis?, closes that gap. Research question two was primarily supported by 
three findings in this analysis. First, the NRC score was the single best predictor of a respondent’s 
perception of the effectiveness of broken windows policing. Better even, than any “real world,” or 
“academic” involvement. Higher NRC individuals seem to overemphasize the effectiveness of 
broken windows policing in crime reduction. Second, I identified nineteen potential sources of 
malagnogenesis, and discovered that the average NRC score of that group was significantly higher 
than other groups. Finally, the NRC score also seems to impact individual research practices. All 
respondents profess an enthusiastic embrace of interdisciplinarity generally, but individuals with 
higher NRC scores jettison that belief when asked specifically about their field of study. 
These findings suggest that neoliberal rationality influences the research practices, 
perceptions, and public profiles of those with higher NRC scores. It, therefore, seems reasonable 
to conclude that neoliberal rationality influences malagnogenesis. This is how harm is made to 
disappear in neoliberal nature and society. As neoliberal rationality reshapes individual 
perceptions  of  value  through  financialization  and  economism,  it  becomes  impossible  to 
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understand, believe, or even perceive the systemic harm that results from pollution, broken 
windows policing, or both. This is how pollution becomes “diamonds in the dirt,” and how the 
vicious cycle of neoliberal destiny is reinforced. With that conclusion, it is instructive to recall that 
Philip Mirowski has discussed some of the ways that neoliberalism works to restrict the “Overton 
Window” of discourse to only those types of knowledge that it itself produces.218 This also 
arguably confirms my earlier argument about the inertial forces that provide an incentive for actors 
to participate in malagnogenesis, thereby enabling adherence to a preferred alternate reality. For 
them, meaning is constructed through relations, and as the inertial forces are entrenched, they style 
themselves as “history’s actors.”219 New knowledges are resisted as a challenge to the dominant 
paradigm, and evidence-based revelations are either irrelevant, or absorbed in parallel. Our 
neoliberal nature and society sets forces in motion, and establishes powerful incentive structures 
that blind and inure us to the resulting harm. In this case, the forces at play are rather easy to 
identify: academic journals enforce the acceptable parameters of debate, and the loss of any chance 
at some “real world” involvement punishes those who deviate. 
The echoes of biological determinism220 in the lead / violence link are certainly 
uncomfortable, but the failure to properly interpret and explain the consequences of this metabolic 
rift is precisely what opened the door to things like the superpredator myth and broken windows 
policing. Existing literatures focused on ‘agnotology’ repeatedly demonstrate that alternate 
realities such as these effectively crowd-out more integrated understandings from any meaningful 
 
218 Mirowski, P. (2013). Never let a serious crisis go to waste: How neoliberalism survived the financial meltdown. 
Verso Books. 
219 Suskind, R. (2004). Faith, certainty and the presidency of George W. Bush. New York Times, 17. Retrieved from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/17/magazine/faith-certainty-and-the-presidency-of-george-w-bush.html 
220 Herrnstein, R. J. and Murray, C. (2010). Bell curve: Intelligence and class structure in American life. Simon and 
Schuster. Interestingly, according to Gilbert and Weiss, in Herrnstein and Murray’s 1994 book, the impacts of 
neurotoxins like lead on childhood cognitive development are not not discussed. 
Gilbert, S. G., and Weiss, B. (2006). A rationale for lowering the blood lead action level from 10 to 2μg/dL. 
Neurotoxicology, 27(5), 693-701. 
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discursive engagement. It would seem that this is the case with the prevailing malagnogenesis with 
regard to broken windows policing and the lead / violence link. As the continued dominance of 
the neoliberal paradigm widens existing metabolic rifts and opens new ones, awareness of the 
knowledge practices discussed in this study will aid in the future interpretation of phenomena like 
the late twentieth century crime wave. When the innocent ‘agnotology’ is replaced with the not- 
so-innocent malagnogenesis it may become easier to envision a political economy that does not 
necessitate the continued “production of contaminated citizens.”221 We therefore require a 
systemic diagnosis, which malagnogenesis reintroduces to the discourse. Malagnogenesis reflects 
a recognition that the very words we use should be built to incorporate the actually existing harm, 
as opposed to other semiotic regimes which seek to tease concepts apart, silo them off, and render 
them useless in their isolation. 
Limitations 
 
Criminologists in the Southeastern United States are not representative of all academia, nor 
can we use their responses to draw many conclusions about the population as a whole. Do 
policymakers in other areas share the same biases that this study may have identified in 
criminology? As an exploratory study, the question is posed and some paths toward answering it 
are outlined herein. Of course, any social science research that relies on the interpretation of 
correlations and other tests of significance to reveal the truth behind the numbers is necessarily 
limited. This is especially true of one question in this study. Recall that a majority (51.35%) of 
respondents to the question about the lead / violence link reported no opinion (i.e., 76 respondents 
answered “Neither Agree nor Disagree”). This is an example of a common issue in social science 
research where, for the purposes of analysis, ordinal data is organized so that it resembles an 
 
221 Sultana, F. (2012). Producing Contaminated Citizens: Toward a Nature-Society Geography of Health and Well- 
Being. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 102(5), 1165-1172. 
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interval scale. Though common practice, a strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7) Likert scale 
does not truly represent interval data. Answer choices may hold different meanings for individual 
respondents, and we cannot be certain of a uniform ‘distance’ between each answer choice. None 
of this is to say that the conclusion(s) drawn from that question are suspect, but simply to note that 
the reasons why so many respondents seem to express no opinion are worthy of further 
investigation. 
The survey instrument used here was also very short, with less than thirty total questions. 
Future research could use a more fine-grained approach to explore the observed relationships. For 
example, the categories of “academic” and “real-world” involvement with broken windows 
policing could be made more specific in order to investigate varieties of each. Furthermore, the 
distinction between general and specific interdisciplinary research practices could be made more 
concrete. Finally, additional demographic and political variables should be cross-referenced with 
the NRC to ascertain whether it accurately measures a unique category or phenomenon (unique 
from say, party affiliation or some other form of political ideology). If the NRC is failing to 
adequately capture the transformation of homo-politicus into homo-oeconomicus, as intended, it 
may need to be fine-tuned. That said, the un-knowing and malagnogenesis revealed by this 
research should be considered even more remarkable, as it takes place in what should be an 
extraordinarily hostile environment: academia. 
Significance 
 
These findings have clear implications for other fields of study that attempt to investigate 
the complex determinants of un-knowing and un-thinking in modernity. Understanding the 
alternate realities that exist for some allows us to imagine a way beyond the prevailing state of 
malagnogenesis. Furthermore, this study investigated an instance of what I call malagnogenesis 
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in real time. Other studies of ‘agnogenesis’ tend to be retrospectives, when the damage is already 
done. In the case of broken windows policing, the alternate reality currently being produced is a 
securitized and revanchist city in which the goal of modern policing is not necessarily crime 
reduction but rather a draconian means of social control.222 In that sense, the broken windows 
program could indeed be seen as a massive success, just not at accomplishing its publicly stated 
goals. The NRC score developed herein reveals this divergence, which suggests that it could be 
useful as an indicator of malagnogenesis. Future research might investigate why those selected for 
“real world” involvement with broken windows policing tend to have higher NRC scores, while 
those excluded seem to have lower NRC scores. Other research programs could also investigate 
their own topics of interest, to identify whether varieties of “real world” involvement display a 
similar selection bias on the NRC scale. As noted earlier, malagnogenesis is not limited 
exclusively to pollution or environmental issues. The production of ignorance that normalizes 
harm for and amongst marginalized populations is on constant display in neoliberal nature and 
society. Everything from financial crises,223 to national security, education, healthcare, gun 
policy,224 climate change and more all exhibit neoliberal agnogenesis that could be better described 
as malagnogenesis. 
By introducing a disparate impact standard to agnogenesis and thus extending it with the 
coining of malagnogenesis as a critical method, this study seeks to challenge the theoretical 
foundations of other research that functionally perpetuates malagnogenesis. Perhaps it is too much 
to  demand  that  all  research  programs  be  emancipatory,  but  they  should  be  able  to  easily 
 
 
222 Smith, N. (1996). The new urban frontier: gentrification and the revanchist city. Psychology Press. 
223 Mirowski, P., & Nik-Khah, E. (2013). Private intellectuals and public perplexity: The economics profession and 
the economic crisis. History of Political Economy, 45(suppl 1), 279-311. 
224 Dossey, L. (2014). Agnotology: On the Varieties of Ignorance, Criminal Negligence, and Crimes Against 
Humanity. Explore: The Journal of Science and Healing, 6(10), 331-344. p.335-339. 
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demonstrate that they are free of malagnogenesis. In this way, I hope to provide some of the tools 
necessary for others to investigate and challenge knowledge production regimes that remain 
stubbornly blind to malagnogenesis. To that end, I was guided by Gilles Deleuze’s “toolbox” of 
pragmatic philosophy. The philosophical approach of Deleuze and Felix Guattari was ably 
described by Brian Massumi in the introduction to A Thousand Plateaus: 
...its goal is the invention of concepts that do not add up to a system 
of belief or an architecture of propositions that you either enter or 
you don’t, but instead pack a potential in the way a crowbar in a 
willing hand envelops an energy of prying.225 
Similarly, it is my hope that the coinage of the malagnogenesis concept helps to satisfy the call 
that Donna Haraway made in 1988, namely: 
We are also bound to seek perspective from those points of view, 
which can never be known in advance, that promise something quite 
extraordinary, that is, knowledge potent for constructing worlds less 
organized by axes of domination.226 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
225 Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (1988). A thousand plateaus: Capitalism and schizophrenia. Bloomsbury Publishing. 
p.XV 
226 Haraway, D. (1988). Situated knowledges: The science question in feminism and the privilege of partial 
perspective. Feminist studies, 575-599. p.577-578
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Survey Questions 
 
Demographics: 
Please select an appropriate answer: 
D1) I am a criminologist, and / or my research involves the study of crime. Answer choices: True 
/ False 
D2) Please select your age cohort. Answer choices: 20-29 / 30-39 / 40-49 / 50-59 / 60 and up D3) 
Please indicate your gender. Answer choices: Male / Female / Other / Choose not to answer D4) 
Please indicate your ethnicity. Answer choices: (1) White, (2) Hispanic or Latino, (3) Black or 
African American, (4) Native American or American Indian, (5) Asian or Pacific Islander, (6) 
Other 
D5) Please indicate your employment status. Answer choices: (1) Tenured Professor, (2) Tenure 
Track Professor, (3) Adjunct Professor, (4) Other Non-Tenure Academic, (5) Graduate Student, 
(6) I am not employed by an academic institution, (7) Other 
 
Neoliberal Rationality Construct: 
Please evaluate the following statements using the scale provided: 
NR1) Time is money. Answer choices: Strongly Disagree: 1 - Strongly Agree: 7 
NR2) Well designed public assistance programs include a work requirement. Answer choices: 
Strongly Disagree: 1 - Strongly Agree: 7 
NR3) If we could encourage more people to act like entrepreneurs, a lot of social problems would 
be ameliorated. Answer choices: Strongly Disagree: 1 - Strongly Agree: 7 
NR4) Public goods & services work better when they are fee-based. Answer choices: Strongly 
Disagree: 1 - Strongly Agree: 7 
NR5) I believe that “freedom” means “freedom to X,” not “freedom from X.” (Eg: the freedom to 
eat vs. freedom from hunger.) Strongly Disagree: 1 - Strongly Agree: 7 
 
Research Practices: 
RP1) Crime is a narrowly defined phenomenon and can be studied as such. Answer choices: 
Strongly Disagree: 1 - Strongly Agree: 7 
RP2) In my research, I actively attempt to integrate findings from other disciplines. Answer 
choices: Strongly Disagree: 1 - Strongly Agree: 7 
RP3) When my research hypotheses are not borne out, I cast a wide net, including other disciplines, 
in search of alternate explanations. Answer choices: Strongly Disagree: 1 - Strongly Agree: 7 
RP4) The environmental determinants of crime include things like pollution. Answer choices: 
Strongly Disagree: 1 - Strongly Agree: 7 
RP5) Please select any factor(s) which make(s) it more difficult to conduct interdisciplinary 
research. Answer choices: (1) funding concerns, (2) lack of good publishing opportunities, (3) lack 
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of potential collaborators, (4) lack of demand, (5) lack of time, (6) other social pressures, (7) other 
professional pressures, (8) none of these make this more difficult. 
 
Broken Windows: 
BW1) Policing disorder strategies like “broken windows” had a significant impact on recent (1990- 
2015) reductions in crime rates. Answer choices: Strongly Disagree: 1 - Strongly Agree: 7 
BW2) I have published research that references, evaluates, or mentions the policing strategy 
commonly known as “broken windows.” Answer choices: True / False 
BW3) I have been interviewed about, consulted on, or otherwise been involved with the 
implementation of policies that might be considered a broken windows policing strategy. Answer 
Choices: True / False 
 
Lead / Violence: 
LV1) The removal of lead from gasoline after 1986 had a significant impact on recent (1990-2015) 
reductions in crime rates. Answer choices: Strongly Disagree: 1 - Strongly Agree: 7 
LV2) I have conducted research in collaboration with another researcher who could be considered 
an environmental (science) policy expert. Answer choices: True / False 
LV3) I have published research that referenced, evaluated, or mentioned a connection between 
leaded gasoline and crime rates. Answer choices: True / False 
LV4) I have been interested in or attempted to conduct research that would reference, evaluate or 
mentions a connection between leaded gasoline and crime rates. Answer choices: True / False 
LV5)  Please  select  any  factor(s)  which  make(s)  it  more  difficult  to  conduct  research  that 
references, evaluates or mentions a connection between leaded gasoline and crime rates: Answer 
choices: (1) funding concerns, (2) lack of good publishing opportunities, (3) lack of potential 
collaborators, (4) lack of demand, (5) lack of time, (6) other social pressures, (7) other professional 
pressures, (8) none of these make this more difficult. 
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Appendix B: IRB Approval Letter 
 
 
 
5/16/2016 
 
Kevin Martyn 
School of Geosciences 
4202 E. Fowler Avenue 
Tampa, FL 33620 
 
RE: Exempt Certification 
IRB#: Pro00025172 
Title:  How Mature Capitalism Turns Pollution Into Diamonds: Malagnogenesis and the 
Reverse-Engineering of Harm Into Risk 
 
Dear Mr. Martyn: 
 
On 5/16/2016, the Institutional Review Board (IRB) determined that your research meets criteria 
for exemption from the federal regulations as outlined by 45CFR46.101(b): 
 
(2) Research involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, achievement), 
survey procedures, interview procedures or observation of public behavior, unless: 
(i) information obtained is recorded in such a manner that human subjects can be identified, 
directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects; and (ii) any disclosure of the human 
subjects' responses outside the research could reasonably place the subjects at risk of criminal or 
civil liability or be damaging to the subjects' financial standing, employability, or reputation. 
 
As the principal investigator for this study, it is your responsibility to ensure that this research is 
conducted as outlined in your application and consistent with the ethical principles outlined in 
the Belmont Report and with USF HRPP policies and procedures. 
 
Please note, as per USF HRPP Policy, once the Exempt determination is made, the application is 
closed in ARC. Any proposed or anticipated changes to the study design that was previously 
declared exempt from IRB review must be submitted to the IRB as a new study prior to initiation 
of the change. However, administrative changes, including changes in research personnel, do not 
warrant an amendment or new application. 
 
Given the determination of exemption, this application is being closed in ARC. This does not 
limit your ability to conduct your research project. 
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We appreciate your dedication to the ethical conduct of human subject research at the 
University of South Florida and your continued commitment to human research protections.  
If you have any questions regarding this matter, please call 813-974-5638. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
John Schinka, Ph.D., Chairperson 
USF Institutional Review Board 
 
